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INTRODUCTION 
Courts are critically important institutions. They preside over private 
disputes brought before them, oversee much agency action, and even 
overturn legislation. In short, courts have tremendous power. That power, 
in turn, calls for acceptance of courts’ authority by litigants who submit, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, to their jurisdiction. 
Courts that hear disputes between private citizens and the federal 
government may particularly need a reputation for procedural fairness 
because of the possibility that such an institution may be viewed as 
captured by the governmental party that routinely appears before it. Any 
indication that such a court is not turning square corners1 may undermine 
its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 
The United States Tax Court (Tax Court) is an important example of a 
court that only hears disputes between private parties and the federal 
government. Each year, it closes cases worth billions of dollars in the 
 
 
 1. Cf. Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920) (“Men must turn 
square corners when they deal with the Government.”). 
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aggregate.2 Moreover, although taxpayers face a choice of forum, that 
choice is often more theoretical than real because the Tax Court is the only 
forum in which to litigate a federal tax case without first paying the 
amount in dispute.3 The overwhelming majority—approximately ninety-
five percent—of litigated federal tax cases are filed in Tax Court.4 
Accordingly, the public’s perception of the Tax Court may also affect its 
perception of the tax system as a whole, and thereby affect tax 
compliance.5 
The Tax Court recently received a lot of attention from the national 
press6 in the wake of a United States Supreme Court decision, Ballard v. 
Commissioner, that found the Tax Court’s failure to include in the record 
on appeal the initial findings of fact and opinion in a multi-million dollar 
tax fraud case anomalous and unwarranted.7 The Supreme Court’s 
decision in that case ultimately resulted in disclosure of the original 
factfinding report—a document some were unsure existed because of 
language the Tax Court used in orders denying taxpayer motions to 
produce the report.8 The report, disclosed six years after the Tax Court 
decision, differed dramatically on the critical issues of fraud and witness 
 
 
 2. In cases closed in fiscal year 2006, for example, the aggregate tax deficiency was 
approximately $7.4 billion. See 1996–2006 U.S. TAX CT. ANN. REP., tbl.4 (on file with author) 
[hereinafter TAX CT. 1996–2006 REP.].  
 3. David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 17, 18.   
 4. Id. The principal reason for the Tax Court’s popularity as a forum is that it is the only forum 
in which to litigate a federal tax deficiency without first paying the amount claimed by the IRS. See 
Susan V. Sample & Samira A. Salman, Tax Shelter Penalties: Are They Divisible? Or Does the 
Taxpayer Have to Pay the Balance Before Litigating?, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 447, 448 (2004). 
 5. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (arguing that procedural fairness is 
critical in maintaining the legitimacy of authority, and that legitimacy affects self-reported compliance 
with laws); Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in 
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 223, 243 tbl.2, 244 fig.2, 245 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (finding negative 
correlation between level of perceived governmental procedural fairness and acceptability of tax 
evasion). 
 6. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Court Upholds Evasion Ruling in a Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 4, 2007, at 23; Maurice Possley, Tax Court Case Stirs Multiple Questions; Request for Judges’ 
Trial Findings Rebuffed, CHI. TRIB., July 10, 2005, at C1 [hereinafter Possley, Tax Court Case Stirs 
Multiple Questions]; Maurice Possley, Tax Court Findings Secretly Changed in at Least 5 Cases, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 1, 2005, at C1 [hereinafter Possley, Tax Court Findings Secretly Changed]; Louise Story, 
A Glimpse Inside U.S. Tax Court and How It Made a Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2005, at C4. 
 7. See Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40 (2005). The Tax Court opinion found tax attorney 
Burton Kanter and two business associates, Claude Ballard and Robert Lisle, liable for over $30 
million dollars in taxes, penalties, and interest. Declaration of Randall G. Dick, Inv. Research Assocs. 
v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M (CCH) 951 (1999) (No. 43966-85), reprinted in Stephen M. Shapiro, Kanter 
Estate Files Supreme Court Brief for Release of Special Trial Judge’s Report, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
Nov. 30, 2004, available at 2004 TNT 230-11 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Declaration of Randall Dick]. 
 8. See infra text accompanying note 152.  
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credibility from the official opinion that purported to “agree[] with and 
adopt[]” the report.9 The events of Ballard raise important questions about 
the Tax Court’s procedures with respect to such fundamental activities as 
factfinding, rule making, and document retention, as discussed below.10 
Although management of federal courts is decentralized so that each 
court is largely self-governing, federal courts are served and overseen by 
centralized bodies, including the United States Judicial Conference and the 
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (AOUSC). These bodies establish 
policies and procedures for the Article III federal courts,11 help the courts 
implement them, and make a single aggregate budget request to 
Congress.12 The U.S. Court of Federal Claims, an Article I court13 that 
provides a forum for trial-level litigation of claims against the federal 
government, is treated as part of the judiciary for these purposes.14 
By statute, the Tax Court is a “court of record”15 that engages in purely 
judicial functions, and the Supreme Court has said that it is a “Court of 
Law” exercising judicial power.16 Like district-court decisions, Tax Court 
decisions are appealed to the courts of appeals and are reviewable, on 
 
 
 9. Inv. Research Assocs., 78 T.C.M. (CCH) at 963; compare infra text accompanying notes 
144–48 (quoting Inv. Research Assocs., 78 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1083–85), with infra text accompanying 
notes 164–65 (quoting Initial Report of Special Trial Judge Couvillion, Inv. Research Assocs., 78 
T.C.M. (CCH) 951 (No. 43966-85), reprinted in Ballard Special Trial Judge Opinion Released to 
Eleventh Circuit, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 6, 2005, available at 2005 TNT 107-16 (LEXIS)).  
 10. See infra Part II. These questions may undermine confidence in the Tax Court and encourage 
tax protestors, which could threaten the federal tax system. See Danshera Cords, Tax Protestors and 
Penalties: Ensuring Perceived Fairness and Mitigating Systemic Costs, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1515, 
1518. 
 11. “Today, . . . the words ‘the federal courts’ and ‘the federal judiciary’ are still commonly used 
to refer to that set of judges who have life tenure (‘Article III judges’), but the equation is imprecise.” 
Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. 
REV. 909, 910 (1990).  
 12. See 28 U.S.C. § 605 (LexisNexis 2007); infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 13. See 28 U.S.C. § 171(a).  
Those courts created by Congress pursuant to the power granted in article I, section 8, clause 
9, and article III have come to be referred to as “constitutional” or “article III” courts, while 
those created under other powers vested in Congress under article I are referred to as 
“legislative” or “article I” courts. 
Burns, Stix Friedman & Co. v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 392, 394 (1971). 
 14. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 145 n.17 (1995) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims is lodged 
within the judicial branch for administrative purposes.”); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 610, 2071; Federal 
Judicial Center, Courts of the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisc (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2008) (listing the Court of Federal Claims in “Courts of the Federal Judiciary,” not among 
“Federal Courts Outside the Judiciary”). 
 15. I.R.C. § 7441 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 16. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 889–91 (1991). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/1
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certiorari, by the Supreme Court.17 Yet, Congress has left the Tax Court 
out of the administrative framework to which most federal courts belong. 
As a result, it is “neither fish nor fowl”—it is no longer an agency but it is 
not a member of the judicial branch of government. Thus, the Tax Court is 
not served by the AOUSC or otherwise subject to the Judicial Code.18 Yet, 
because it is not an agency, it is not subject to the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA)19 or the agency provisions of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).20  
This Article argues that rather than leaving the Tax Court to its own 
devices, Congress should recognize the entirely judicial nature of the Tax 
Court by making it subject to the AOUSC; the Rules Enabling Act; and, 
with respect to its rulemaking, the Judicial Conference. These 
straightforward but important structural changes should decrease the Tax 
Court’s insularity, increase its accountability, and help reduce 
inefficiencies. These changes also would help increase the respect 
accorded the Tax Court.  
The Article proceeds in three principal parts. Part I focuses on the 
fundamental question of the extent to which the Tax Court truly is a court. 
The Tax Court officially ceased to be an administrative agency in 1969.21 
Yet, in many ways, the Tax Court is still not really a “federal court.” This 
Part explores some of the ways in which the Tax Court has been 
overlooked and the unfortunate consequences that result.  
 
 
 17. I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1). Tax Court cases are reviewable by the courts of appeals “in the same 
manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” 
Id. 
 18. See LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 14, at 145 n.17 (“[O]ther 
Article I courts—the United States Tax Court, United States Court of Veterans Appeals, and United 
States Court of Military Appeals—either exist as independent entities or receive administrative support 
from the executive branch.”). 
 19. See Megibow v. Clerk of the U.S. Tax Court, 432 F.3d 387, 387 (2d Cir. 2005); Ostheimer v. 
Chumbley, 498 F. Supp. 890, 892 (D. Mont. 1980), aff’d, 746 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1984). 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 provides publicity rules that apply to “[e]ach agency.” The term “agency” is defined, in part, as 
follows: “‘agency’ means each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is 
within or subject to review by another agency, but does not include . . . the courts of the United 
States.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (LexisNexis 2007). It appears that the Tax Court is a “court[] of the United 
States” for this purpose. See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.  
 20. See Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006); Ewing v. 
Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 50 (2004) (Thornton, J., concurring) (“Since its enactment in 1946, the APA 
has never governed proceedings in this Court (or in its predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals).”), 
rev’d & vacated, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 21. See Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, Part III: The 
Revenue Act of 1926—Improving the Board of Tax Appeals, 40 ALB. L. REV. 253, 257 (1976), 
reprinted in HAROLD A. DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 113 
(1979). 
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Part II of the Article discusses areas in which the Tax Court has 
followed procedures that are unusual in their lack of transparency.22 Some 
of these areas became apparent in the fallout from Ballard v. 
Commissioner,23 the high-profile, multi-million-dollar tax fraud case 
mentioned earlier, which was decided by the Supreme Court in 2005. 
Other transparency issues predate Ballard.  
Part III proposes to remedy an important anomaly in the federal system 
by treating the Tax Court like other courts, thereby increasing the Tax 
Court’s accountability. This would not require remaking the Tax Court as 
an Article III court, a change that would entail giving Tax Court judges 
life tenure24 and would likely raise controversial issues that are 
unnecessary for Congress to face.25 Instead, the Tax Court should be 
subject to the judicial institutions that already govern courts such as the 
Article I Court of Federal Claims. Part III also explains the efficiency and 
other benefits of this proposal.  
I. IS THE TAX COURT REALLY A COURT? 
The Tax Court is based in Washington, D.C., though it conducts trials 
in cities nationwide.26 All of the Tax Court’s cases involve disputes 
 
 
 22. Transparency is an important attribute for courts. Professor Lynn LoPucki recently argued: 
“Transparency would transform the court system. Corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, 
and favoritism would first be exposed, and then largely disappear. Public confidence in the system 
would increase, because the system would become worthy of it.” Lynn M. LoPucki, Court System 
Transparency 3 (UCLA School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research 
Paper No. 07-28, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013380. See also Judith Resnik, 
Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are 
at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 521, 524 (2006) (“Over time and in part through the practice of public 
display, concepts about accountability and transparency in government decisionmaking, fair treatment 
between disputants, and respect for ordinary persons moved from the realm of the customary into that 
of right.”). 
 23. 544 U.S. 40 (2005). In the Ballard litigation, the Tax Court found tax attorney Burton Kanter 
and two business associates, Claude Ballard and Robert Lisle, liable for over $30 million dollars in 
taxes, penalties, and interest. Declaration of Randall Dick, supra note 7. 
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 25. In 1988, the Federal Courts Study Committee proposed breaking the Tax Court up into an 
Article I trial division with exclusive jurisdiction and an Article III appellate division. FED. COURTS 
STUDY COMM., REP. OF THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMM. (1990), reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REV. 733, 
807–09 (1990). However, five committee members dissented from the proposal, stating, “All segments 
of the bar intimately connected with the tax litigation system—the Internal Revenue Service, the 
Treasury Department, the Justice Department, the Tax Court, the Claims Court, and the American Bar 
Association—have voiced their opposition to this proposal.” Id. at 809–10. Previous proposals to make 
the Tax Court an Article III court also met substantial opposition. See infra text accompanying notes 
59–66. 
 26. Laro, supra note 3, at 23.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/1
p 1195 Lederman book pages.doc 5/30/2008 1:39:00 PM  
 
 
 
 
 
2008] MAKING THE TAX COURT MORE JUDICIAL 1201 
 
 
 
 
between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).27 The Tax 
Court’s core jurisdiction is over cases involving an IRS assertion that the 
taxpayer understated the correct tax liability, resulting in a tax 
“deficiency.”28 In those cases, the taxpayer has an alternative to Tax Court 
jurisdiction; by paying the amount in dispute, the taxpayer may pursue the 
case in a U.S. district court or the Court of Federal Claims. 
“In broad outline, pretrial procedure before the Tax Court is similar to 
that applicable in most trial courts.”29 To invoke the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction, the taxpayer files a petition.30 The IRS must file an answer.31 
Discovery is available in Tax Court, though its use is more limited than in 
the district courts, and the parties are required to stipulate to the facts of 
the case to the fullest extent possible.32 
Tax Court trials are bench trials. By statute, the Tax Court has nineteen 
judges who serve for fifteen-year terms.33 The judges are presidential 
appointees,34 and they come from an array of backgrounds.35 Judges may 
assume senior status.36 In addition, the Chief Judge has the power to 
appoint Special Trial Judges (STJs), judicial officers who are somewhat 
analogous to magistrate judges,37 though they are employees at will.38 
 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 22; I.R.C. § 6211(a) (LexisNexis 2007) (defining “deficiency”). “In many 
situations where the taxpayer has filed a timely original return showing a tax liability, the deficiency is 
the amount by which the taxpayer’s true tax liability exceeds the liability shown on the return.” 
Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory 
Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 185 n.14 (1996) (citing Arthur W. Andrews, The 
Use of the Injunction as a Remedy for an Invalid Federal Tax Assessment, 40 TAX L. REV. 653, 654 
n.5 (1985)). 
 29. Joseph R. Cook & Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 
Part V: Pretrial Procedure, 41 ALB. L. REV. 639, 640–41 (1977), reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 
21, at 218–19. 
 30. See I.R.C. § 6213; TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 30, 34. The Tax Court promulgates its own 
procedural rules. See I.R.C. § 7453; infra text accompanying notes 276–79. 
 31. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 30, 36. “The pleading stage of proceedings generally terminates with 
the Commissioner’s responsive pleading, the answer, but occasionally, the taxpayer may be required to 
reply to allegations in the answer.” Cook & Dubroff, supra note 29, at 641, reprinted in DUBROFF, 
supra note 21, at 219. 
 32. See TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 91 (stipulation requirement); TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 70–76 
(discovery rules). 
 33. I.R.C. § 7443(a), (e). 
 34. Id. § 7443(b). 
 35. See United States Tax Court, Judges, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/judges.htm (last visited Apr. 
10, 2008) (providing backgrounds of current Tax Court judges, senior judges, and special trial judges). 
 36. See I.R.C. § 7447(c). 
 37. See Kathleen Pakenham, You Better Shop Around: The Status and Authority of Specialty 
Trial Judges in Federal Tax Cases, 103 TAX NOTES 1527, 1531–33 (2004) (comparing the roles of 
STJs and magistrate judges). As explained further below, by statute, special trial judges have the 
authority to hear but not decide Tax Court cases involving amounts in excess of $50,000. See infra 
note 140 and accompanying text. 
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STJs are permitted to hear any Tax Court case,39 but they are only 
authorized to render the decision in a subset of cases.40 STJs decide most 
of the “small tax cases,” which are cases with limited amounts in dispute, 
decided under an informal procedure.41 
The Court of Federal Claims, one of the other fora available for federal 
tax litigation, has been described as anomalous42 because it is an Article I 
court “lodged within the judicial branch for administrative purposes.”43 It 
has been described as having “no clear standing in the structure of courts 
generally”44 and “lack[ing] . . . any clear location . . . in the Government’s 
organizational chart.”45  
Unfortunately, the Tax Court is in an even more uncertain position. 
Like the Court of Federal Claims, the Tax Court is not an agency and thus 
is not subject to FOIA or the agency provisions of the APA.46 However, 
unlike the Court of Federal Claims, the Tax Court is not governed by the 
provisions that apply to most federal courts.47  
The Tax Court’s evolution from its tenure as an agency informs its 
status today. From the early days of the Board of Tax Appeals, it endured 
doubts as to its independence from the IRS.48 Congress periodically 
increased its independence and authority, ultimately reconceiving it as an 
Article I court. Yet, the Tax Court retains vestigial attributes of a noncourt 
tribunal, and it continues to face allegations of bias in its decision 
making.49  
This Part describes the Tax Court’s metamorphosis into a “court of 
record”50—a designation with both symbolic and substantive significance. 
It also explores how Congress did not allow the Tax Court to complete its 
 
 
 38. See I.R.C. § 7443A. 
 39. Id. § 7443A(b). Consent of the parties is not required for assignment of a case to a STJ. See 
id. 
 40. Id. § 7443A(c). 
 41. Id. § 7463. 
 42. See, e.g., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 14, at 145 n.17; cf. 
Judith Resnik, Of Courts, Agencies, and the Court of Federal Claims: Fortunately Outliving One’s 
Anomalous Character, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 799 (2003).  
 43. LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 14, at 145 n.17. 
 44. See Eric Bruggink, A Modest Proposal, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 529, 529 (1999).  
 45. Id. at 542 (referring to a consequence of being an Article I court).  
 46. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.  
 47. See supra text accompanying notes 18–20.  
 48. James Edward Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls: An Empirical Study 
of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV. 351, 354–55 (1999).  
 49. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 50. I.R.C. § 7441 (LexisNexis 2007). 
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development, but rather stunted its growth by isolating it from the federal 
judiciary. 
A. From an Independent Agency to an Article I Court 
The Board of Tax Appeals was created by statute in 1924 as an 
independent executive agency51 in response to both the “emergence during 
World War I [of the federal income and profits taxes] as the preeminent 
devices for financing the operations of Government”52 and “the 
inadequacy of preexisting institutions, both administrative and judicial, for 
adjudicating in an acceptable manner the disputes growing out of the 
changed conditions brought on by the new taxes.”53 For its first two years, 
decisions of the Board were not final as to tax liability and could be 
attacked by the losing party in federal district court.54 In 1926, Congress 
provided instead for appellate review of Board decisions.55 Although there 
has been some question about whether the Board actually constituted an 
Article I court even while it was denominated an agency,56 and although 
the Board was renamed the “Tax Court of the United States” in 1942,57 the 
Tax Court did not officially become an Article I court until 1969.58  
Before 1969, there were a number of unsuccessful efforts to make the 
Tax Court into an Article III federal court.59 There were several sources of 
 
 
 51. Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, Part II: Creation of 
the Board of Tax Appeals—The Revenue Act of 1924, 40 ALB. L. REV. 53, 95–96 (1975), reprinted in 
DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 90. 
 52. Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, Part I: The Origins of 
the Tax Court, 40 ALB. L. REV. 7, 7 (1975), reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 1. 
 53. Id. Prior to the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals, the only judicial remedy available to 
contest IRS action was a suit for refund. Id. at 34, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 28. Then, 
as now, full payment of the tax in question was a prerequisite for a refund suit. Id. at 39, reprinted in 
DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 33. 
 54. Dubroff, supra note 21, at 260, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 116. 
 55. Id. at 262, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 118. 
 56. Id. at 257, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 113 (“Whether the Board should be 
considered to have been created as a legislative court in light of subsequent developments in the 
decisional law, is impossible to answer definitively.”); see also Stern v. Comm’r, 215 F.2d 701, 708 
(3d Cir. 1954) (“Whether it is a legislative court created by Congress under Article I, section 8, of the 
Constitution, like the Customs Court, or some other form of judicial agency placed for convenience of 
housekeeping in the Executive Branch of the Government is, therefore, merely a matter of legal 
semantics since, whatever it may be called, it is an ‘independent’ judicial agency the work of which is 
not subject to supervision or review in the Executive Branch of the Government but only by the federal 
appellate courts.”).  
 57. Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, Part IV: The Board 
Becomes a Court, 41 ALB. L. REV. 1, 20 (1977), reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 184. 
 58. See I.R.C. § 7441 (LexisNexis 2007); Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 
83 Stat. 487, 730. 
 59. See Dubroff, supra note 57, at 20–40, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 184–204. One 
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opposition to Article III status for the Tax Court,60 the most important of 
which amounted to “turf wars” over who would be entitled to appear in 
such a court.61 One of these was the question of who would represent the 
government. The Treasury Department apparently wished to continue 
representing the government in Tax Court and the Justice Department did 
not wish to do so, but both departments were concerned that the Justice 
Department would have to take over representation in Tax Court if the 
court became an Article III court.62  
The other key question was who would be entitled to represent 
taxpayers before the court. Nonattorneys were allowed to practice in the 
Board of Tax Appeals from the time it was established, and there was a 
concern that Article III status would eliminate the possibility of 
representation by accountants.63 In 1948, for example, when hearings were 
held on a bill to codify Title 28 of the United States Code, which included 
provisions to make the Tax Court an Article III court, “although it 
constituted only a small part of the recodification of title 28, most of the 
hearings were concerned with the question of whether Tax Court practice 
should be restricted to attorneys.”64 Ultimately, the provisions that would 
have made the Tax Court an Article III court and have moved it to Title 28 
were stripped from the bill.65 
The late 1960s saw another effort to make the Tax Court an Article III 
court. Although the proposal drew support from various groups, “the 
historical problems persisted, particularly the issue of government 
representation in Tax Court proceedings.”66 Ultimately, Congressman 
Wilbur D. Mills submitted a bill providing Article I status for the Tax 
 
 
of these efforts was during the mid-1940s, when the House of Representatives was working on a 
project to consolidate the statutes relating to the federal judiciary into Title 28 of the United States 
Code. Id. at 21, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 185. 
 60. Id. at 20–40, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 184–204.  
 61. See David F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions: Dobson Revisited, 49 TAX 
LAW. 629, 647 (1996); see also H. Cecil Kilpatrick, Should the Tax Court Be Made a Court? A Reply 
to Some Objections, 9 J. TAX’N 7, 7–8 (1958). 
 62. See Dubroff, supra note 57, at 30–31, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 194–95. 
 63. See id. at 32–35, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 196–99.  
 64. Id. at 36, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 200. One commentator, writing in 1955, 
stated, “It is a sad commentary upon two great professions that the Tax Court has thus far been denied 
its just position because of the long-standing feud between tax lawyers and accountants.” Daniel M. 
Gribbon, Should the Judicial Character of the Tax Court be Recognized?, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
619, 621 (1956). 
 65. See Dubroff, supra note 57, at 36, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 200. 
 66. Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by the Federal 
Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985, 993 
(1991) (footnotes omitted). 
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Court.67 The legislation also renamed the court the “United States Tax 
Court” (from the Tax Court of the United States), “following the general 
form by which federal courts are named.”68 No hearings were held, and the 
provision became law as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.69  
Thus, in 1969, Congress explicitly made the Tax Court an Article I 
court.70 The Tax Court’s activities were already judicial71 and did not 
change significantly.72 Yet, the official designation of the Tax Court as a 
court had both symbolic and substantive significance. Thurman Arnold 
wrote in 1935, with respect to the symbolic importance of courts: 
Courts are bound by precedent, and bureaus are bound by red 
tape. . . . 
 . . . [A] court is a body toward which we take an attitude of 
respect because we use it to symbolize an idea of impersonal 
justice. A bureau is a body which has little symbolic function, and 
which therefore is entitled to no greater respect than are the 
individuals composing it.73 
Soon after becoming a court, the Tax Court published an order in the 
Federal Register deleting the chapter relating to the Tax Court from the 
Code of Federal Regulations. The order declared that “publication in the 
Federal Register of the Court’s public notices, orders, rules, and other 
public documents is no longer within the purview of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”74 In addition, in 1975, the Tax Court finally moved out of 
the building it shared with the IRS “to its own building on Judiciary 
Square, near other federal courts and the District of Columbia judiciary.”75 
 
 
 67. See id. 
 68. Dubroff, supra note 57, at 49, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 213. 
 69. See Geier, supra note 66, at 993. 
 70. The statute states, in relevant part: “There is hereby established, under article I of the 
Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax Court.” I.R.C. 
§ 7441 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 71. See Kilpatrick, supra note 61, at 7.  
 72. The Tax Court was given the authority to “punish contempt of its authority by fine or 
imprisonment, and provided that in carrying out its powers the court should have the same assistance 
as is provided generally to federal courts.” Harold Dubroff, Federal Taxation, 1973 ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 265, 272 (1973) (citing Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 956, 83 Stat. 732 (amending 
I.R.C. § 7456(d))). 
 73. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 201–06 (1935). 
 74. Deletion of Chapter, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,462 (1970) (deleting Chapter 2, Title 26 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations). 
 75. International Conference on Courts with Tax Jurisdiction: Conference Discussion Agenda: 
Responses and Materials Provided by the Participants in the International Conference of Courts with 
Income Tax Jurisdiction, 8 VA. TAX REV. 255, 296 (1988) [hereinafter International Conference on 
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“The fact that, despite efforts over many years, the court was only able to 
secure its own courthouse after the 1969 changes is ample evidence of the 
benefit of its new status.”76  
B. In the Interstices of Government 
1. A “Legislative Court” 
Although Congress declared the Tax Court to be a court in 1969, it did 
not make it part of the judicial branch, even for administrative purposes,77 
and did not clarify where it fits within the federal government. The Tax 
Court’s Article I designation has itself been an important source of 
questions about its status,78 including a question as fundamental as 
whether its structure is constitutional.79 Nonetheless, although the literal 
language of Article III vests the “judicial Power of the United States” in 
courts in which judges have life tenure and compensation that cannot be 
reduced,80 it is generally accepted that the Tax Court’s Article I status is 
constitutionally acceptable.81  
 
 
Courts with Tax Jurisdiction]. Before the move, “[t]he court’s independence from the IRS was not 
apparent to those taxpayers who had to pass through the corridors of the Service to get to the Tax 
Court facilities.” Samuel B. Sterrett, The United States Tax Court: A Tumultuous 20 Years, 57 TAX 
NOTES 949, 949 (1992).  
 76. Dubroff, supra note 57, at 51 n.352, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 215 n.352; see 
also Laro, supra note 3, at 22 (“In 1974, the Tax Court solidified its independence from the executive 
branch (and the IRS) by moving its physical location from the National Office of the Internal Revenue 
Service to its own separate building . . . .”). 
 77. See LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 14, at 145 n.17 (“[T]he 
United States Tax Court, United States Court of Veterans Appeals, and United States Court of Military 
Appeals[] either exist as independent entities or receive administrative support from the executive 
branch.”).  
 78. See, e.g., Dubroff, supra note 72, at 272–85; Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I 
Court: Is the Tax Court’s Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357 (2001); 
David F. Shores, Article I Status for the Tax Court, 25 TAX LAW. 335 (1972).  
 79. See, e.g., Geier, supra note 66, at 985; Daniel L. Ginsberg, Is the Tax Court Constitutional?, 
35 MISS. L.J. 382 (1963). 
 80. Article III of the Constitution provides in part:  
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both 
of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, 
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article I courts do not benefit from the life-tenure and salary maintenance 
protections of Article III. See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial 
Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646 (2004). 
 81. See, e.g., Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court’s Jurisdiction over Due Process Collection 
Appeals: Is it Constitutional?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 453, 456 (2003) (“Although several lower federal 
courts have held, without significant analysis, that the Tax Court is constitutional, it is unlikely at this 
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The odd role that “legislative courts,” such as the Tax Court, occupy in 
the federal system is exemplified by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Freytag v. Commissioner.82 In Freytag, the parties consented to the 
assignment of their case to an STJ after the judge who had originally been 
handling the case became ill.83 The taxpayers’ petition for certiorari 
included the question of whether the Appointments Clause84—which 
allows Courts of Law to appoint inferior officers—allows the Tax Court to 
appoint STJs.85  
The Supreme Court held that STJs are inferior officers, and that, 
accordingly, their appointment is subject to the constraints of the 
Appointments Clause.86 The IRS argued that the Tax Court is a 
“Department.”87 An amicus argued that the Tax Court is a “Court of Law”; 
both the IRS and the taxpayers disagreed with that view.88 A five-member 
majority of the Court rejected the IRS’s argument and adopted the 
amicus’s view.89 Accordingly, the Court found:  
The Tax Court exercises judicial, rather than executive, legislative, 
or administrative, power. . . . By resolving these disputes [between 
taxpayers and the government], the court exercises a portion of the 
judicial power of the United States. . . . 
 . . . . 
 
 
late date that the Supreme Court would ever consider whether the congressional grant of power to the 
Tax Court to conduct deficiency proceedings is an unconstitutional encroachment on the judicial 
power by the legislature.”); see also Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 581, 610 n.141 (1985); cf. Geier, supra note 66, at 1032–33. 
 Recently, Professor James Pfander argued that the terms “courts” in Article III and “tribunals” in 
Article I are not really synonymous. Thus, he argues, Congress is empowered to create both Article III 
“courts” inferior to the Supreme Court and inferior “tribunals” under Article I, of which the Tax Court 
is one. See Pfander, supra note 80, at 650–51, 658 n.53. Professor Pfander’s analysis would eliminate 
any constitutional issue regarding the Tax Court’s status as an Article I entity. Further discussion of 
this question is beyond the scope of this Article. The Article assumes that the Tax Court’s structure as 
an Article I court is constitutionally permissible. 
 82. 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
 83. Id. at 871. 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 85. See Geier, supra note 66, at 996 n.64. 
 86. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82. 
 87. Id. at 884. 
 88. Id. at 884, 885–86. 
 89. A concurring opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by three other Justices, argued 
both that the Court did not need to reach the Appointments Clause issue, id. at 892 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and that the Tax Court is not a “Court of Law” but 
rather a “Department,” id. at 901 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
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 The Tax Court’s function and role in the federal judicial scheme 
closely resemble those of the federal district courts, which 
indisputably are “Courts of Law.” Furthermore, the Tax Court 
exercises its judicial power in much the same way as the federal 
district courts exercise theirs.90 
Thus, the Supreme Court found that the Chief Judge’s appointment of 
STJs is constitutionally permissible because, for purposes of the 
Appointments Clause of Article II, the Tax Court is a “Court of Law.”91 
Moreover, the Court held that the Tax Court “exercises a portion of the 
judicial power of the United States,”92 although the “judicial Power of the 
United States” is referenced in Article III, not the Appointments Clause.93 
The concurring opinion in Freytag was scathing on this point, and 
concluded that “‘[t]he judicial power,’ as the Court uses it, bears no 
resemblance to the constitutional term of art we are all familiar with, but 
means only ‘the power to adjudicate in the manner of courts.’”94  
2. Left to Its Own Devices 
The Freytag case shows how fundamental questions about the Tax 
Court’s place in the federal system can be. Freytag involved constitutional 
interpretation, but similar questions arise in the statutory arena. For 
example, is the Tax Court, which was created by Congress, a “court[] 
established by Act of Congress” for purposes of the Rules Enabling Act?95  
One scholar has noted that “[l]egislative courts are not generally 
considered to be ‘courts of the United States’ within the meaning of 
section 451 of the Judicial Code, and are presumably not subject to the 
various provisions relating to the administration of federal courts.”96 Is the 
 
 
 90. Id. at 890–91. 
 91. Id. at 890. 
 92. Id. at 891. 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 94. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 908 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
Professor Pfander has argued that his proposed court/tribunal distinction “invites reconsideration” of 
the application of synonymity in Freytag. Pfander, supra note 80, at 676 n.158. 
 95. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (LexisNexis 2007). The same question arises with respect to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 457, which provides for disposal of obsolete papers by “any court established by Act of Congress . . . 
in accordance with the rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States.” The definition section 
located in the same chapter defines “court of the United States,” not “court established by Act of 
Congress.” 28 U.S.C. § 451. 
 96. Shores, supra note 78, at 339–40 (footnotes omitted). That section does not currently appear 
to include the Tax Court within its scope. 28 U.S.C. § 451 provides, in part:  
The term “court of the United States” includes the Supreme Court of the United States, courts 
of appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of 
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Tax Court then a “court of the United States” for purposes of exclusion 
from the ambit of the APA?97 Most of these questions have generally 
accepted answers, but not straightforward ones provided by statute or even 
by regulation. For example, with respect to the APA, the Attorney 
General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act states that the 
term “courts of the United States” includes the Tax Court.98 
a. Practical Arrangements 
A footnote to the legislative history of the 1969 legislation that made 
the Tax Court an Article I court provided that the Tax Court would not be 
subject to the AOUSC or the Judicial Conference.99 The AOUSC “is the 
central support entity for the judicial branch.”100 Because the AOUSC does 
not provide routine service to the Tax Court, the Tax Court generally has 
to develop its own procedures for issues that have already been addressed 
centrally by the AOUSC.101 The inefficiencies this creates are perhaps 
most obvious in the context of the Tax Court’s travels to approximately 
seventy-five cities around the country to hear cases.102 In 1958, while the 
Tax Court was still formally an administrative agency, one commentator 
noted that the Tax Court often found it hard to obtain appropriate hearing 
rooms when it travelled.103 He argued that “[i]f it were removed from the 
 
 
International Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled 
to hold office during good behavior. 
28 U.S.C. § 451. The Tax Court’s judges are entitled to hold office for fifteen years, not “during good 
behavior.” I.R.C. § 7443(e) (LexisNexis 2007). 
 97. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (LexisNexis 2007). 
 98. See Robin J. Arzt, Recommendations for a New Independent Adjudication Agency to Make 
the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act Benefits Claims, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 267, 330–31 (2003) (“The Manual is a part of the legislative history of the APA. 
The Manual is ‘a contemporaneous interpretation’ of the APA that has been ‘“given some deference 
by [the Supreme] Court because of the role played by the Department of Justice in drafting the 
legislation, and Justice [Tom C.] Clark was Attorney General both when the APA was passed and 
when the Manual was published.”’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 99. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 304 n.3 (1969).  
 100. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/adminoff.html 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2008). 
 101. Some of these procedures may be based on procedures of the AOUSC. See U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES TAX COURT: TAX COURT CAN 
REDUCE GROWING CASE BACKLOG AND EXPENSES THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS 24 
(1984), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d5t1/124125.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON TAX COURT 
BACKLOG] (“Although not under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Conference or the Administrative 
Office, the Tax Court usually abides by their guidelines for district court judges.”). 
 102. See TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. app. III, available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/rules/ 
Appendix3.pdf.  
 103. Kilpatrick, supra note 61, at 7. In 1950, then–Presiding Judge John W. Kern wrote: 
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Executive Branch, it could be serviced in this way and many other ways 
by the [AOUSC], which takes so much of the administrative burden off 
the other Federal courts.”104  
The problem persisted after the 1969 legislation. A 1984 GAO report 
recommended that the Tax Court make arrangements with the AOUSC to 
borrow space when hearing cases outside of Washington, D.C., so as to 
lower costs.105 It noted: 
The Tax Court has not entered into a working arrangement with the 
[AOUSC], the agency responsible for the managing of the federal 
court system, to obtain space where needed. Officials of the 
Administrative Office informed us that they have made 
arrangements for some other traveling federal courts, such as the 
Claims Court, and could also do so for the Tax Court.106 
b. Budget Requests 
Article III courts’ budgets are requested centrally.107 By contrast, the 
Tax Court makes its budget requests directly to Congress,108 and those 
 
 
[W]e have had a problem which has plagued us for many years in obtaining adequate 
courtroom facilities for our hearings. This has been complicated by the fact that our 
correspondence in connection with courtrooms has been largely with custodians of Federal 
buildings who are not concerned about the effective functioning of the Tax Court of the 
United States. It is obvious that this correspondence . . . is an unsatisfactory method of 
obtaining courtrooms from local Federal courts. 
John W. Kern, The Process of Decision in the United States Tax Court, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1013, 1015–16 (1950).  
 104. Kilpatrick, supra note 61, at 7.  
 105. GAO REPORT ON TAX COURT BACKLOG, supra note 101, at 19. Internal Revenue Code 
section 7446 provides:  
The times and places of the sessions of the Tax Court and of its divisions shall be prescribed 
by the chief judge with a view to securing reasonable opportunity to taxpayers to appear 
before the Tax Court or any of its divisions, with as little inconvenience and expense to 
taxpayers as is practicable. 
I.R.C. § 7446 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 106. GAO REPORT ON TAX COURT BACKLOG, supra note 101, at 20. The Court of Federal Claims 
(formerly the Court of Claims) is subject to the AOUSC. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 610 (LexisNexis 
2007). 
 107. See 28 U.S.C. § 605 (“The Director [of the Administrative Office], under the supervision of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States, shall submit to the Office of Management and Budget 
annual estimates of the expenditures and appropriations necessary for the maintenance and operation 
of the courts . . . . Such estimates shall be approved, before presentation to the Office of Management 
and Budget, by the Judicial Conference of the United States, except that the estimate with respect to 
the Court of International Trade shall be approved by such court and the estimate with respect to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be approved by such court.”). 
 108. See Dubroff, supra note 57, at 51, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 215; Geier, supra 
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requests are considered by the tax-writing committees.109 Despite the 
effort this requires, the Tax Court likely has preferred it this way.110 
Professor Harold Dubroff explains that “the congressional tax committees 
. . . traditionally have accorded [the Tax Court] sympathetic treatment.”111  
The Tax Court’s authority to request its budget directly from Congress 
raises concern. Not only does Congress write the Internal Revenue Code, 
but the very committees that do so are the ones to which the Tax Court 
presents its budget requests. This may raise unfortunate questions about 
the Tax Court’s ability to be entirely objective in its resolution of the cases 
before it, all of which involve the federal government as a party.112 
Moreover, the Tax Court faces a natural temptation to explain to the tax-
writing committees, in support of its budget requests, how well it is 
enforcing the tax laws. For example, in justifying the Tax Court’s fiscal 
year 1990 budget, then–Chief Judge Nims said, “During fiscal year 1988, 
the dollar amount of deficiencies ultimately determined by the Court to be 
owed by taxpayers was $1.3 billion, over 46 times the amount of our fiscal 
 
 
note 66, at 1001 n.77; Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., The Tax Litigation Process: Where It Is and Where 
It Is Going, 44 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 825, 841 (1989). In 1958, then–Chief Judge of the Tax 
Court, J. Edgar Murdock, explained: 
The chief judge is in charge of all administrative matters. . . . [Among other tasks,] budgets 
must be made up and approved and appropriations obtained. The chief judge is assisted in 
these and other administrative functions by the clerk of the court and by the administrative 
officer of the court, each of whom supervises about 30 employees.  
J. Edgar Murdock, Tax Court Is Fulfilling Its Function; No Fundamental Changes Needed, 8 J. TAX’N 
106, 109 (1958). 
 109. See International Conference on Courts with Tax Jurisdiction, supra note 75, at 296 (“The 
Court primarily deals in Congress with the tax writing committees. Appropriations are by 
subcommittees handling treasury and general government appropriations—not the judiciary.”). 
 110. Tannenwald, supra note 108, at 840–41 (“The court’s present relations with the Finance and 
Ways and Means Committees are eminently satisfactory. Moreover, the court presents its own budget 
directly to Congress . . . .”); see also Dubroff, supra note 57, at 51, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 
21, at 215. 
 111. Dubroff, supra note 57, at 51, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 215. 
 112. See, e.g., John A. McGuire, Letter to the Editor, More on Judicial Bias in the Tax Court, 55 
TAX NOTES 1556, 1556 (1992). One commentator explains the general ethical issue posed by courts 
funded from revenues they collect: 
The concept of the self-supporting courts has ethical implications if the court in any way uses 
money it generates from judgments to pay its operational expenses. It is beyond dispute that 
this practice is not consistent with judicial ethics or the demands of due process, and there are 
relatively few remaining situations of this type. A more common problem is that 
appropriating bodies sometimes link amount of revenue collected by courts for the public 
treasury with the level of appropriations, placing pressure on courts to pay their own way . . . . 
ROBERT W. TOBIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS PUB. NO. R-184, FUNDING THE STATE COURTS: 
ISSUES AND APPROACHES, at 50 (1996) (footnotes omitted), available at http://contentdm.ncsconline. 
org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/financial&CISOPTR=5. 
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year 1990 budget request.”113 The Tax Court made similar statements in 
support of its budget requests for 1984 through 1989.114  
Although the Tax Court apparently has not made similar statements in 
budget requests for years after 1990, the structural issue remains that the 
Tax Court requests funding directly from the congressional committees 
responsible for writing the tax legislation that underlies the IRS’s claims 
that taxpayers owe additional taxes. Professor Deborah Geier has argued 
that this raises concern because Tax Court judges need to be independent 
from both Congress and the Executive in their decision making, but 
Congress has the power to alter the salaries of Tax Court judges.115 
Questions about the objectivity of the Tax Court may encourage tax 
protestors and undermine confidence in the tax system, which is 
antithetical to voluntary compliance.116 Tax Court judges and others have 
made a number of efforts over the years to counter allegations of bias on 
the part of the Tax Court.117 However, it may be difficult to dispel a 
perception of bias that is fostered by these structural arrangements without 
changing the underlying institutional structures.  
3. Limited Transparency and Accountability 
One unfortunate effect of the Tax Court’s unusual place in the judicial 
system is that it lacks a regulatory structure. For example, as indicated 
 
 
 113. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1990: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Treasury, Postal Serv., and General Government Appropriations 
of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 101st Cong. 320–31 (1989) (statement of Hon. Arthur L. Nims, 
III, Chief Judge, U.S. Tax Court). 
 114. For example, in the conclusion to his 1987 statement to the Senate Subcommittee on 
Appropriations for the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, then–Chief Judge Sterrett 
stated, “During fiscal year 1986, the amount of deficiencies ultimately determined by the Court to be 
owed by taxpayers was $758,863,980, or about 27 times the amount of our fiscal year 1988 budget 
request.” Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988: 
Hearings on H.R. 2907 Before the Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government of 
the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong. 207-22, 215 (1987) (statement of Hon. Samuel B. 
Sterrett, Chief Judge, U.S. Tax Court), reprinted in Chief Judge Sterrett Highlights 1986 Act’s Effect 
on the Tax Court, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 3, 1987, available at 87 TNT 41-8 (LEXIS). Multiple 
commentators remarked on the Tax Court’s 1987 statement in this regard. See Melvin A. Coffee, Tax 
Court Should Not Be the Sole Forum for Tax Disputes, 41 TAX NOTES 777, 777 (1988); McGuire, 
supra note 112, at 1556.  
 115. Geier, supra note 66, at 1001 n.77. 
 116. See Cords, supra note 10, at 1518; see also infra note 117 (citing articles discussing claims of 
Tax Court bias). 
 117. See, e.g., Laro, supra note 3, at 18 (“[A] myth has arisen over the years that the court is 
sometimes predisposed in favor of the government.”); Tannenwald, supra note 108, at 827 (referring 
to “a canard that has existed for a long time, namely that the Tax Court is a pro-government tribunal”); 
Maule, supra note 48, at 425–26 (“The Tax Court is not biased in favor of the IRS. If anything, it 
might be biased in favor of taxpayers, but that is an issue deserving its own empirical study.”). 
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above, the Tax Court is subject neither to the regulations of the AOUSC118 
nor to the policies of the Judicial Conference,119 even though they are 
designed for federal courts. This limits the Tax Court’s accountability. 
Occasionally, the Tax Court falls between the cracks entirely, leaving it 
exempt from regulation in areas in which both agencies and other courts 
are regulated.120  
One important example involves public access to Tax Court 
information. Because the Tax Court is no longer an agency, it is not 
subject to FOIA.121 Thus, unlike the IRS, for example, it is not required to 
publish certain documents in the Federal Register,122 make certain others 
available for public inspection,123 and release others upon request.124 In 
addition, the AOUSC imposes no obligation on the Tax Court to make 
public any documents, statistics, or data.125  
The Tax Court has a set of aggregate case statistics that it will release 
on request. However, the Tax Court’s process for releasing these statistics 
does not follow published guidelines and does not seem to be 
regularized.126 Traditionally, such statistics were produced by the 
 
 
 118. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; infra note 120. In at least one instance, the Tax 
Court was unable to follow AOUSC regulations, although it wanted to. See Decision of the 
Comptroller General, Matter Of: U.S. Tax Court—Travel Entitlements of Special Trial Judges, File 
No. B-215525 (Jan. 17, 1985), available at http://archive.gao.gov/lglpdf13/126000.pdf [hereinafter 
Travel Entitlements of Special Trial Judges] (requiring Tax Court, under Code section 7456(c), to 
apply to STJs the Federal Travel Regulations instead of AOUSC regulations because Tax Court was 
not in judicial branch). This was later changed by statute. See I.R.C. §§ 7443(d), 7443A(e), 7471(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007). 
 119. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 304 n.3 (1969); infra text accompanying note 254. 
 120. For example, correspondence between the Tax Court and the Comptroller General of the 
United States in 1985 reflected a lack of governing rules with respect to artwork in the judges’ 
chambers. The Comptroller General explained: 
U.S. Tax Court, a legislative court of record, is not bound by GSA [General Services 
Administration] regulation on personal convenience items (41 C.F.R. § 101-26.103-2) which 
applies only to executive branch agencies, nor by an Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts regulation (Title VIII of the “Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures”) since 
the Tax Court is not part of the judicial branch. 
Decision of the Comptroller General, Matter Of: Purchase of Decorative Items for Individual Offices 
at the United States Tax Court 1, 5–6, File B-217869 (Aug. 22, 1985), available at http://archive.gao. 
gov/lglpdf16/127736.pdf [hereinafter Matter of Purchase of Decorative Items]. 
 121. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 122. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2007). 
 123. See id. § 552(a)(2). 
 124. See id. § 552(a)(3). 
 125. By contrast, “data assembled by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts . . . and the Federal 
Judicial Center . . . include[s] information about every case filed in federal district court and every 
appeal filed in the twelve non-specialized federal appellate courts.” Theodore Eisenberg & Margo 
Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial 
Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1456 (2003). 
 126. Four of the five annual statistical reports on file with the author (1990, 1993, 1994, and 2005) 
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“Statistics and Reports Section,”127 but that Section apparently no longer 
exists.128 The Tax Court also does not release a database suitable for 
research, unlike the AOUSC.129 
 
 
were issued in different months of the year. See 1995–2005 U.S. TAX CT. ANN. REP. (Oct. 12, 2005) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter TAX CT. 1995–2005 REP.]; STATISTICS AND REPORTS SECTION, 
UNITED STATES TAX COURT FISCAL YEAR STATISTICAL INFORMATION (Dec. 1994) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter TAX COURT 1994 REPORT]; STATISTICS AND REPORTS SECTION, UNITED STATES 
TAX COURT FISCAL YEAR STATISTICAL INFORMATION (Nov. 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
TAX COURT 1993 REPORT]; STATISTICS AND REPORTS SECTION, UNITED STATES TAX COURT FISCAL 
YEAR 1990 STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1 (Jan. 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter TAX COURT 
1990 REPORT]. The most recent of these reports, which is for 2006, is undated. TAX CT. 1996–2006 
REP., supra note 2. 
 The reports also vary in their comprehensiveness. Not counting the cover page, the reports issued 
in January 1991 and November 1993 each include five pages, but the report issued in December 1994 
only contains three pages. The two pages included in the 1993 report but not the 1994 report include 
tables entitled “Analysis of Cases Closed by Stipulated and Opinion Decisions (By dockets, including 
Small Tax Cases)” and “Analysis of Cases Closed by Stipulated and Opinion Decisions (By dockets, 
Small Tax Cases only).” These pages provide the “Govt. Recovery Rate” for each year included in the 
report, broken out by stipulated decision and opinion decision for each year. The reports released in 
2005 and 2006 each contain nine pages. See TAX CT. 1995–2005 REP., supra; TAX CT. 1996–2006 
ANN. REP., supra note 2.  
 127. See TAX COURT 1994 REPORT, supra note 126; TAX COURT 1993 REPORT, supra note 126; 
TAX COURT 1990 REPORT, supra note 126.  
 128. The Tax Court’s telephone directory on its website does not list a “Statistics and Reports 
Section.” See United States Tax Court, Telephone Numbers, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/phone.htm 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2008). The 2006 set of statistics makes no reference to such a section. See TAX 
CT. 1996–2006 REP., supra note 2. 
 129. See Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From Documents to Data, 
Particulars to Patterns 26–27 (Cornell Law School Research Paper No. 08-003, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1107412 (describing and critiquing the database). Cf. Eisenberg & Schlanger, 
supra note 125. Professor Lynn LoPucki has pointed out:  
Effective public oversight requires access not just to the content of court documents, but to 
the patterns in courts’ activity.  
 To reveal the patterns of court activity, someone must extract court data from documents, 
combine them with data from other sources, and process them into the statistics, graphs, 
tables, and other visual displays that would render them intelligible. 
LoPucki, supra note 22, at 3. 
 The Tax Court has a docket-inquiry system on its website, but the documents referenced there, 
such as petitions and motions, cannot be downloaded. See United States Tax Court Docket Inquiry, 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/docket.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). Tax Court opinions (Division and 
Memorandum Opinions starting September 25, 1995, and Tax Court Summary Opinions starting 
January 1, 2001) can be searched and downloaded. See United States Tax Court, Opinions Search, 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcInOp/asp/HistoricOptions.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). The Tax 
Court has also announced that “[o]rders issued or entered and oral findings of fact or opinion (bench 
opinions) delivered after March 1, 2008, will also be available to the public through the Court’s 
Internet Web site without registration for electronic access.” Press Release, U.S. Tax Court, 
Amendments to the Rules of Practice and Procedure Adopted 1 (Jan. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/011508.pdf.  
 By contrast: 
PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) is an access service run by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Through PACER, you can access the case 
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Congress did not intend the Tax Court’s proceedings to be opaque. It is 
required by statute to have open proceedings and published reports,130 
reflecting a concern for transparency that dates back to the creation of the 
Board of Tax Appeals.131 Although these provisions relating to Tax Court 
trials and opinions are important and useful, they focus on cases, and are 
thus limited in their scope. They do not cover, for example, Tax Court rule 
making or policy making, or the release of aggregate data on Tax Court 
decision making.  
Currently, the Tax Court’s principal source of oversight is the appellate 
review process.132 That oversight is necessarily case specific, not 
 
 
and docket data maintained by more than 187 federal courts—9 appellate, 89 district and 89 
bankruptcy courts and the Court of Federal Claims.  
Nancy Henry, Federal Dockets on the Net, LAW PRAC. MGMT., Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 24, 24. One scholar 
notes: 
So far as public access is understood as referring only to the records of discrete proceedings, 
the online system created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and Judicial 
Conference of the United States opens an unprecedented vista. Anyone knowing the parties, 
approximate date, and court can find and retrieve full docketing information and increasingly 
all filed documents for the case. Full transcripts are coming. There is a charge. The interface 
could be friendlier. One has to register. But whether compared with the degree of openness 
previously furnished by hardcopy records or that available in the states, the federal online 
system lets in an unprecedented amount of light producing a high degree of visibility. 
Martin, supra, at 25. 
 130. See I.R.C. §§ 7459, 7461, 7462 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 131. See Dubroff, supra note 51, at 67–71, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 61–65. The 
legislative history of the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals reflects a concern about the 
consequences of secrecy that were thought to be allayed by adoption of the predecessor of what is now 
section 7461: 
To the minority it seems inconceivable that any controversy existing between the Government 
and a taxpayer should be adjudicated and finally determined in a star chamber proceeding. 
The minority will, therefore, propose an amendment to the bill which will provide that all 
such proceedings, records, and evidence in connection therewith shall be public. 
S. REP. NO. 68-398, pt. 2, at 12 (1924) (statement of Sen. Jones). 
 132. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), formerly the General Accounting Office, has 
issued occasional reports on the Tax Court. See, e.g., GAO REPORT ON TAX COURT BACKLOG, supra 
note 101. That report was issued “[a]t the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal 
Service and General Government, Senate Committee on Appropriations.” Letter from William J. 
Anderson, Dir., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Hon. Howard A. Dawson, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Tax 
Court, in GAO REPORT ON TAX COURT BACKLOG 3, supra note 101. A search of the GAO website for 
documents containing the phrase “Tax Court” in the title, not limited by date, retrieved six documents 
spanning 1970 to 1989. The other five reports include a one-page letter relating to a review of 
settlement of Tax Court accounts, Letter from George L. Egan, Jr., Acting Reg’l Manager, Wash. 
Reg’l Office, General Accounting Office, to Hon. William M. Drennen, Chief Judge, U.S. Tax Court 
(Aug. 31, 1970), available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0202/092875.pdf; another one-page letter, 
relating to an audit and evaluation of payroll and leave records and procedures, Letter from D. L. 
Scantlebury, Reg’l Manager, Wash. Reg’l Office, Gen. Accounting Office, to Hon. William M. 
Drennen, Chief Judge, U.S. Tax Court (Oct. 14, 1970), available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0202/ 
092844.pdf; Travel Entitlements of Special Trial Judges, supra note 118; Matter of Purchase of 
Decorative Items, supra note 120; and Statement of Jennie S. Stathis, Director, Tax Policy and 
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systemwide, and is limited to the information in the record before the 
appellate court. It is very difficult for appellate courts to exercise oversight 
over events that occur outside of the record on appeal. That is particularly 
true for systemic procedures such as rule making and the setting of 
internal policies relating to the release of information and the like. In 
addition, the possibility of appellate oversight has no application to the 
numerous Tax Court cases that are decided under the small tax case 
procedure,133 a process that requires waiver of appellate review.134 
Congress certainly is capable of overseeing the Tax Court; the 
Oversight Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee 
investigated events related to Ballard v. Commissioner, which is discussed 
further in Part II.135 However, Congressional investigations are not 
designed to provide routine guidance and oversight. 
II. A LOOK AT THE TAX COURT’S INSULARITY 
Although the Tax Court appears in many ways similar to other courts, 
at times its behavior has surprised observers. Most critiques of the Tax 
Court involve issues in which the Tax Court has lacked the transparency 
that is customary for a court, which limits its accountability.136 This Part 
divides these issues into those relating to transparency in the court’s 
decision making, and those relating to the Tax Court’s process for 
promulgating the procedural rules that apply to its cases. 
 
 
Administration, Issues Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, House 
of Representatives, on Administration’s Fiscal Year 1990 Budget Proposals for IRS and the Tax Court 
(Apr. 4, 1989), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat15/138401.pdf. 
 133. See TAX CT. 1995–2005 REP., supra note 2, tbls.1 & 2 (showing 24,551 cases filed in 2005, 
of which 13,571 were small tax cases). 
 134. See I.R.C. § 7463(b).  
 135. See Crystal Tandon & Karla L. Miller, Judges’ Statements on Kanter, Ballard Provoke 
Dismay, 108 TAX NOTES 394, 395 (2005) (“As previously reported, the House Ways and Means 
Oversight Subcommittee is conducting an investigation to learn more about the Rule 183 process 
employed by the Tax Court in Ballard.”).  
 136. Courts have both transparent and opaque procedures. See Legal Theory Lexicon 015: 
Transparency, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/ legal_theory_le_1.html. We 
generally expect courts to follow transparent procedures when issue of deference or independence of 
decision makers is involved. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. We also expect transparency 
in contexts in which a lack of transparency would permit shirking, such as whether or not a judge 
participated in rendering a particular decision. See infra text accompanying notes 222–28. The author 
thanks Larry Solum for suggesting these contexts. 
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A. Transparency Issues in the Decision-Making Process 
1. The Events of Ballard: Confidential Procedures Exposed  
Ballard v. Commissioner, the high-profile case mentioned above that 
ultimately went to the Supreme Court, involved several consolidated 
cases.137 Three of the taxpayers litigating against the IRS’s claim of tax 
fraud were Burton Kanter, a well-known tax lawyer and adjunct law 
professor; Claude Ballard, a Prudential Insurance Co. of America 
(Prudential) real estate executive; and Tom Lisle, who “headed the 
division responsible for lending money and buying and building real estate 
for Prudential.”138  
In the Tax Court, the cases were assigned to STJ D. Irvin Couvillion to 
decide under Tax Court Rule 183.139 Rule 183 provides procedures 
implementing a statutory provision that authorizes the Chief Judge to 
assign tax deficiency cases involving large dollar amounts to STJs to hear 
but not decide.140 As then worded, Rule 183 required that, in such a case, 
“the Special Trial Judge shall submit a report, including findings of fact 
and opinion, to the Chief Judge, and the Chief Judge will assign the case 
to a Judge or Division of the Court.”141 Tax Court Judge Howard A. 
Dawson, Jr., a senior judge,142 was assigned to review STJ Couvillion’s 
report.  
a. The Tax Court’s First Official Opinion 
The Tax Court’s 1999 opinion, issued by Judge Dawson, stated, “The 
Court agrees with and adopts the opinion of the Special Trial Judge, which 
is set forth below.”143 It found:  
 
 
 137. In Tax Court, the consolidated cases were known as Inv. Research Assocs. v. Comm’r, 78 
T.C.M. (CCH) 951 (1999). The Tax Court’s 1999 decision was appealed to three Circuits, under three 
different names. See Ballard v. Comm’r, 321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2003); Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 
337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2003); Estate of Lisle v. Comm’r, 341 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2003). For ease of 
reference, the case is referred to as Ballard, its name in the Supreme Court. See Ballard v. Comm’r, 
544 U.S. 40 (2005) (deciding the consolidated cases of Ballard and Estate of Kanter). 
 138. Inv. Research Assocs., 78 T.C.M. (CCH) at 969. 
 139. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 183. 
 140. STJs do not have authority to make the court’s decision in cases involving tax deficiencies in 
excess of $50,000. See I.R.C. § 7443A(b), (c) (LexisNexis 2007). In such cases, after trial, the STJ will 
issue a report that amounts to a draft opinion. Under Tax Court Rule 183, the Chief Judge will assign a 
regular Tax Court judge to review the report and enter the decision of the court. See TAX CT. R. PRAC. 
& P. 183. 
 141. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 183(b), reprinted in 93 T.C. 972 (1989).  
 142. See I.R.C. § 7447(c) (retired judges on recall). 
 143. Inv. Research Assocs. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951, 963. 
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Kanter entered into arrangements pursuant to which he would use 
his business and professional contacts . . . to assist individuals 
and/or entities in obtaining business opportunities or in raising 
capital for business ventures. Kanter established a complex 
organization of corporations, partnerships, and trusts to receive, 
distribute, and disguise the payments from these arrangements.144 
The Tax Court further explained that some of the payments came from a 
group of individuals that the parties called “the Five.”145 
The opinion found “[t]he record . . . replete with several indicia of 
Kanter’s fraud.”146 It listed numerous examples, including its view that 
“Kanter’s testimony at trial was implausible, unreliable, and sometimes 
contradictory” and thus not credible.147 Accordingly, the Tax Court held 
that Kanter had committed fraud and the IRS had “proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that Kanter underpaid his taxes for each of the years 
at issue attributable to transactions related to the Five.”148 
When the Tax Court’s opinion was released, tax attorney Randall G. 
Dick, who represented Kanter, “said he thought that [it] sounded as if it 
had been written by two people. He said a friend, Julian I. Jacobs, a judge 
on the tax court, and, later, a special trial judge, Peter J. Panuthos, told him 
that the final opinion had reversed Judge Couvillion’s initial findings.”149 
The taxpayers then filed a series of motions requesting the STJ’s report or 
inclusion of the report in the record on appeal, each of which the Tax 
Court denied.150  
With their third motion, the taxpayers included an affidavit from Mr. 
Dick stating, in part, that he had been told by Tax Court judges that  
substantial sections of the opinion were not written by Judge 
Couvillion, and that those sections containing findings related to the 
credibility of witnesses and findings related to fraud were wholly 
 
 
 144. Id. at 970. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1083. 
 147. Id. at 1085. 
 148. Id. at 1083. 
 149. Louise Story, Secrecy Is Lifted in Some Tax Court Trials, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2005, at C1. 
 150. See, e.g., Tax Court Order, Inv. Research Assocs., 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951 (No. 43966-85), 
reprinted in Tax Court Order Denying Request for Access to STJ Report, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 2, 
2001, available at 2001 TNT 23-30 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Tax Court Order Denying Third Motion] 
(denying taxpayers’ third motion requesting access to the STJ Report); Tax Court Order, Inv. Research 
Assocs. (No. 43966-85), reprinted in Tax Court’s Original Order Denying Motion for Access to STJ 
Report, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 2, 2001, available at 2001 TNT 23-31 (LEXIS) (denying taxpayers’ 
motion of April 20, 2000).  
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contrary to the findings made by Judge Couvillion in his report. The 
changes to Judge Couvillion’s findings relating to credibility and 
fraud were made by Judge Dawson.151 
The Tax Court’s order denying this motion also seemed to deny the events 
described in Dick’s affidavit; the order stated in part: 
Judge Dawson states and Special Trial Judge Couvillion agrees, 
that, after a meticulous and time-consuming review of the complex 
record in these cases, Judge Dawson adopted the findings of fact 
and opinion of Special Trial Judge Couvillion, that Judge Dawson 
presumed the findings of fact recommended by Special Trial Judge 
Couvillion were correct, and that Judge Dawson gave due regard to 
the circumstance that Special Trial Judge Couvillion evaluated the 
credibility of witnesses.152 
The taxpayers appealed the Tax Court’s decision. Because the 
individual taxpayers were located in three different Circuits, the decision 
was appealed to the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits.153 In each Circuit, the taxpayers raised the issue of the 
nondisclosure of the STJ’s report. And, in each case, the Court of Appeals 
agreed with the Tax Court on that issue. In Ballard and Estate of Kanter, 
each Court of Appeals found that the record demonstrated that the report 
adopted in the Tax Court’s opinion was STJ Couvillion’s report.154 Each 
court further found, in the words of the Eleventh Circuit, that “[e]ven 
assuming Dick’s affidavit to be true and affording Petitioners-Appellants 
all reasonable inferences, the process utilized in this case does not give 
rise to due process concern.”155  
 
 
 151. Declaration of Randall Dick, supra note 7. 
 152. Tax Court Order Denying Third Motion, supra note 150 (emphasis added). The order was 
signed by then–Chief Judge Wells, Judge Dawson, and STJ Couvillion. Judge Wells served as chief 
judge from June 1, 2000, to May 31, 2004 (in addition to a brief term as chief judge in 1997). See 
United States Tax Court, Judge Thomas B. Wells, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/judges/wells.htm (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2008). 
 153. See I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2007) (venue for appeal from Tax Court decisions). 
 154. Ballard v. Comm’r, 321 F.3d 1037, 1042–43 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he record as presented to 
us clearly reveals that the report adopted by the Tax Court is Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s 
report.”), rev’d, 544 U.S. 40 (2005); Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 337 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“[W]e accept as true the Tax Court’s statement that the underlying report adopted by the Tax Court 
was in fact Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s.”), rev’d sub nom. Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40 
(2005). 
 155. Ballard, 321 F.3d at 1042; see also Estate of Kanter, 337 F.3d at 840 (“[T]his purportedly 
quasi-collaborative process would not offend our notions of fundamental fairness, nor would due 
process require the inclusion of the report in the appellate record to preserve the fairness of our 
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In Estate of Lisle, the third of the three decisions, the Fifth Circuit 
followed its sister Circuits on the STJ report issue and adopted their 
reasoning. Accordingly, the court found no due process violation.156 
However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s finding of fraud, 
which substantially lowered the tax and penalty amounts.157 Although the 
taxpayers petitioned for certiorari in Ballard and Estate of Kanter on 
issues involving the treatment of the STJ’s report, neither the taxpayers 
nor the IRS petitioned for certiorari in Estate of Lisle. 
b. The Secret Report 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ballard and Estate of Kanter 
and, in 2005, the Court held that the Tax Court was not entitled to exclude 
the report from the record on appeal, under the language of the version of 
Tax Court Rule 183 that existed at that time.158 In the majority opinion, 
written by Justice Ginsburg,159 the Court stated: 
[N]o statute authorizes, and the current text of Rule 183 does not 
warrant, the concealment at issue. We so hold, mindful that it is 
routine in federal judicial and administrative decisionmaking both 
to disclose the initial report of a hearing officer, and to make that 
report part of the record available to an appellate forum. A 
departure of the bold character practiced by the Tax Court—the 
creation and attribution solely to the special trial judge of a 
superseding report composed in unrevealed collaboration with a 
regular Tax Court judge—demands, at the very least, full and fair 
statement in the Tax Court’s own Rules.160 
 
 
review.”). In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Cudahy filed a long opinion dissenting on this issue. See 
Estate of Kanter, 337 F.3d at 874–88 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 156. Estate of Lisle, 341 F.3d 364, 384 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 157. See id. at 367. 
 158. See Ballard, 544 U.S. at 65.  
 159. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justice Thomas. Id. at 68–73. Justice 
Kennedy filed a concurrence in which Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 65–68. 
 160. Id. at 46–47 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also issued a warning to the Tax Court:  
The idiosyncratic procedure the Commissioner describes and defends, although not the 
system of adjudication that Rule 183 currently creates, is one the Tax Court might someday 
adopt. Were the Tax Court to amend its Rules to express the changed character of the Tax 
Court judge’s review of special trial judge reports, that change would, of course, be subject to 
appellate review for consistency with the relevant federal statutes and due process. 
Id. at 65.  
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The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Seventh and Eleventh 
Circuit Courts of Appeals.161 Over the IRS’s opposition, the Eleventh 
Circuit granted the taxpayers’ motion to supplement the record with STJ 
Couvillion’s original report and ordered the Tax Court to produce the 
report within fourteen days.162 The Tax Court did so, and subsequently 
also served a copy of the report on the parties and included it in the record 
of each case.163  
The original report, which, like the Tax Court’s 1999 opinion, was 
quite lengthy, reached the opposite holding from the Tax Court opinion on 
the critical issue of fraud. It stated, in part: 
On the record presented, the Court cannot find or conclude that 
respondent’s claimed kickback schemes existed or, if such schemes 
did exist, that there was fraud in connection with the reporting and 
payment of Federal income taxes on the income generated through 
the purported schemes. . . . Indeed, various witnesses associated 
with “The Five” expressly denied making kickback payments in 
return for Ballard and/or Lisle’s help in directing business to 
them.164 
On the issue of the fraud penalty, the report concluded, in language 
sharply contrasting with the Tax Court’s official opinion: 
Respondent has not established that there was an underpayment of 
tax by any of the petitioners arising out of what respondent 
derisively described throughout the trial of this case as “kickback 
schemes” wherein moneys were exacted as a condition for doing 
 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Eleventh Circuit Order, Ballard v. Comm’r, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 01-
17249), on remand from Ballard, 544 U.S. 40 (2005), reprinted in Court Orders Addition of Special 
Trial Judge’s Report to Record in Ballard Case, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 24, 2005, available at 2005 
TNT 99-26 (LEXIS) (ordering Tax Court to produce STJ Couvillion’s original report). The Seventh 
Circuit, in a 2–1 opinion with Judge Cudahy again dissenting, denied the taxpayers’ motions and 
remanded the case to the Tax Court. See Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 406 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 
2005).  
 163. See Tax Court Order, Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 721 (2007) (No. 712-
86), reprinted in Tax Court Reinstates Trial Judge’s Report in Kanter, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 23, 
2005, available at 2005 TNT 246-16 (LEXIS); Statements of Judges Cohen, Dawson & Couvillion, 
Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 721 (2007) (No. 21555-91), reprinted in Tax Court 
Releases Judges’ Clarifying Statements in Kanter, Ballard, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 22, 2005, 
available at 2005 TNT 140-19 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Clarifying Statements].  
 164. Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion of STJ Couvillion, Ballard v. Comm’r, 429 F.3d 
1026 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 01-17249), reprinted in Ballard Special Trial Judge Opinion Released to 
Eleventh Circuit, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 6, 2005, available at 2005 TNT 107-16 (LEXIS) 
[hereinafter STJ Opinion]. 
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business, and that such moneys constituted income that was no[t] 
reported by petitioners. . . . There is no[] showing that taxes were 
evaded or avoided on any of the payments made by “The Five”. 
Quite the contrary, respondent’s witnesses, including its own 
agents, testified that all of the payments by “The Five” had been 
reported on Federal income tax returns, and the taxes due thereon 
had been paid. . . . The Court . . . does not consider [certain] 
transactions [the IRS cited as indicative of fraud] as even rising to 
the level of suspicion of fraud.165 
Thus, the document that the Courts of Appeals had not had the 
opportunity to see reflected the finding by the trier of fact that the 
taxpayers had not committed fraud. Moreover, unlike the official opinion, 
the report referred several times to Mr. Kanter’s testimony as credible.166 
The Courts of Appeals’ lack of knowledge of these findings and 
conclusions of the trier of fact likely hampered their review, particularly of 
the facts.167  
In fact, after seeing the report, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit stated, “It is obvious now that the withholding of Special Trial 
Judge Couvillion’s original report did, in fact, impede the process of 
appellate review.”168 It ordered the Tax Court to reinstate the STJ’s 
original report and assign the case to a judge who had no prior 
involvement in the case, “who shall give ‘due regard’ to the credibility 
determinations of Judge Couvillion, presuming that his fact findings are 
correct unless manifestly unreasonable.”169  
 
 
 165. Id. (emphasis added). The IRS bears the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence. I.R.C. § 7454(a) (LexisNexis 2007); TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 142(b). 
 166. See STJ Opinion, supra note 164. 
 167. On appeal without the STJ’s original report, all three circuits upheld the Tax Court’s 1999 
decision. See supra text accompanying notes 153–56. By contrast, once the Eleventh Circuit had that 
report, it reversed the Tax Court’s 2007 decision (which, like the 1999 decision, had reached the 
opposite result from the report on the critical issue of fraud), and directed the Tax Court to adopt the 
STJ’s original report. See Ballard v. Comm’r, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7373 (11th Cir. 2008). 
Similarly, in Stone v. Commissioner, 865 F.2d 342, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1989), where the STJ report that 
disagreed with the Tax Court’s official opinion was included in the record, the Court of Appeals 
remanded the matter “for computation of tax in accordance with the findings of the Trial Judge.” Id. 
The Tax Court’s 2007 opinion in Ballard and the Eleventh Circuit’s reversal of it are discussed further 
infra at text accompanying notes 170–75. Stone is discussed further infra at text accompanying notes 
250–52. 
 168. Ballard, 429 F.3d at 1032. 
 169. Id. (emphasis added). This is a strong statement that seems to apply a nontraditional standard 
of review. See Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Conflating Standards of Review in the Tax Court: A 
Lesson in Ambiguity, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1337, 1375 (2008). However, on appeal from the Tax Court’s 
2007 decision, the Eleventh Circuit appeared to equate its “manifestly unreasonable” test with the 
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Judge Haines decided the case on remand.170 To the surprise of 
some,171 his opinion in the case did not adopt the STJ’s original report, but 
instead found that Kanter and Ballard committed fraud.172 The Tax Court’s 
2007 opinion is much more transparent then its 1999 opinion, however. 
The 2007 opinion notes which findings of fact are new, and it documents 
“departures from the recommended findings of fact in the STJ report . . . 
[with] a comment either in the text or in the margin (including appropriate 
citations of the record).”173 It also explains that even if “the Five” did not 
know about the alleged kickback scheme, as STJ Couvillion found, that 
does not necessarily mean that there was no such scheme.174 Most 
important, the inclusion of the STJ’s original report in the record has 
empowered the Courts of Appeals to do a thorough review on appeal. In 
fact, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently reversed the 
Tax Court’s 2007 decision, finding that Judge Haines did not give 
adequate deference to the findings of the trier of fact, STJ Couvillion.175 
c. Revelation of the Collaborative Process 
After the original report in Ballard was released and served on the 
parties, then–Chief Judge Gerber took the unusual step of issuing an order 
that served on the parties to Estate of Lisle statements on behalf of STJ 
Couvillion, Judge Dawson, and Judge Mary Ann Cohen, who had been the 
 
 
familiar “clearly erroneous” standard of review. See Ballard, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7373, at *13–
*16.  
 In 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed the lead of the Eleventh Circuit, 
remanding to the Tax Court with instructions that quoted from the Eleventh Circuit’s 2005 opinion. 
See Estate of Lisle v. Comm’r, 431 F.3d 439, 439–40 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
 170. See Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 721 (2007). The opinion was rendered in 
all three cases, which were consolidated on remand before Judge Haines. See id. at 729. 
 171. See Michael H. Plowgian, Svetoslav S. Minkov & T. Wesley Brinkley, Federal Taxation, 57 
MERCER L. REV. 1115, 1120 (2006) (“Given that all of the primary witnesses in the case are now 
deceased, it seems unlikely that Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s findings will be overturned in the Tax 
Court on remand.”); Sheryl Stratton, Tax Court Finds Fraud on Second Run Through Kanter/Ballard, 
114 TAX NOTES 624, 626 (2007) (“It would be ‘a gross understatement’ to say that Steve Brown of 
Martin, Brown & Sullivan in Chicago, who is counsel for the Ballards and the Lisle estate, was 
surprised by the new opinion. He had predicted the odds of the Tax Court’s entering an opinion 
resembling the one entered on February 1 at zero.”). 
 172. Estate of Kanter, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 721 (2007). 
 173. Id. at 736. 
 174. The Five knew that Kanter was using his influence with Ballard and Lisle to obtain business 
opportunities for them with Prudential, for which they were compensating Kanter with a finder’s fee, 
but they may not have known if Kanter was sharing the finder’s fee with Ballard and Lisle (the alleged 
kickbacks). See id. at 744–45. 
 175. Ballard, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7373, at *74. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1195 Lederman book pages.doc 5/30/2008 1:39:00 PM  
 
 
 
 
 
1224 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:1195 
 
 
 
 
Chief Judge at the time of the Tax Court opinion in Ballard.176 The 
statements explained the collaborative process that had occurred between 
STJ Couvillion’s completion of the original report and the Tax Court’s 
release of its official opinion, as well as the events that led up to that 
collaboration.  
In her statement, Judge Cohen explained that she had initially referred 
STJ Couvillion’s report to Judge Dawson.177 After Judge Dawson told her 
that he could not adopt the report and Judge Jacobs declined to review it 
because of his friendship with one of the taxpayers’ attorneys, Judge 
Cohen read the report “to see if I could adopt it myself.”178 She explained: 
I concluded that the facts found did not, in my view, support the 
proposed opinion. I scheduled a meeting with Judge Dawson and 
Judge Couvillion for the purpose of deciding how to proceed. The 
day before the scheduled meeting, Judge Couvillion notified my 
office that he was withdrawing the report. It was then agreed that he 
and Judge Dawson would conduct a further review of the record and 
submit a further report.179 
Judge Couvillion added, “After discussion between myself and Judge 
Dawson, on September 1, 1998, I requested that the report I submitted be 
withdrawn for further consideration. The original report was returned to 
me soon after that time.”180 According to the statements of the judges, 
Judge Couvillion and Judge Dawson then “worked together on each of the 
many issues.”181 Judge Dawson explained that “[t]here were 
communications, consultations, discussions, cross reviews, and 
modifications. It was a collaborative judicial deliberation and process.”182 
Judge Cohen added: 
I was aware that Judge Dawson and Judge Couvillion were 
collaborating on a revised report. The revised report was received in 
my office in October 1999. After I reviewed it, I concluded that it 
was much more persuasive than the initial report, and I authorized 
its release as a memorandum opinion.183 
 
 
 176. See Clarifying Statements, supra note 163.  
 177. Id. (statement of Judge Cohen). 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. (statement of STJ Couvillion). 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. (statement of Judge Dawson). 
 183. Id. (statement of Judge Cohen). 
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The Ballard case thus revealed a collaborative decision-making process 
that had previously been hidden, and which the Supreme Court found 
inconsistent with a Tax Court rule that did not expressly provide for such a 
procedure. In her post-Ballard statement about the Tax Court’s actions on 
STJ Couvillion’s report, Judge Cohen also declared that “[w]hat occurred 
was the collegial process used with all reports of judicial officers of the 
Tax Court.”184 Yet, the Tax Court’s statement in over 900 Rule 183 cases 
that it “agrees with and adopts the opinion of the Special Trial Judge, 
which is set forth below”185 had been taken at face value by tax lawyers—
including in prior Supreme Court litigation186—until the Ballard litigation 
unfolded.187 Note that the standard Rule 183 statement referred to the 
“opinion of the Special Trial Judge,” not a collaborative opinion. 
Collaboration between the trial judge and reviewing judge is 
inconsistent with the deference called for in Rule 183. Rule 183 calls for a 
process in which the two judges act independently of each other. In 
addition, deference and independence are both contexts that require 
transparency, to assure that deference was given and independence was 
preserved.188 Moreover, if the reviewing judge’s role is analogous to the 
role of an appellate judge—a view the cases interpreting the “due regard” 
 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 337 F.3d 833, 839 (7th Cir. 2003); see also id. at 876 (Cudahy, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]n the 880-plus Tax Court decisions since 1983 that I 
could find that involved an STJ report, the Tax Court judge purported to agree with and adopt the 
opinion of the STJ in every instance.”); Possley, Tax Court Findings Secretly Changed, supra note 6 
(“In all, there were more than 900 cases over the past two decades in which a lower level trial court 
judge handled a case and made a finding that was reviewed by a Tax Court judge who issued the 
official court opinion.”). 
 186. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 872 n.2 (1991); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 203–07. 
 187. See Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 58 n.13 (2005) (“The Tax Court’s post-1983 process for 
reviewing special trial judge reports appears not to have been comprehended, even by cognoscenti, 
prior to the airing it has received in these cases.” (citing Stephanie Francis Cahill, Tax Judges Decide 
Cases They Do Not Hear, 37 ABA J. E-Report 3 (Sept. 27, 2002) (reporting tax attorney Gerald 
Kafka’s statement that “[w]hen this case surfaced, a lot of people scratched their heads”))).  
 188. See supra note 136. The Supreme Court’s reaction to the Tax Court’s practice points to the 
deference rationale for transparency: “One cannot tell whether, as Rule 183(c) requires, the final 
decision reflects ‘[d]ue regard’ for the special trial judge’s ‘opportunity to evaluate the credibility of 
[the] witnesses,’ and presumes the correctness of that judge’s initial factfindings.” Ballard, 544 U.S. at 
46.  
 The Court also alluded to the independence rationale: “The Tax Court’s practice of not disclosing 
the special trial judge’s original report, and of obscuring the Tax Court judge’s mode of reviewing that 
report, impedes fully informed appellate review of the Tax Court’s decision.” Id. at 59–60 (emphasis 
added); see also Estate of Kanter, 337 F.3d at 880 n.6 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The judicial independence of finders of fact . . . is a structural principle. . . . [P]roviding access 
to the STJ’s original report would allow for judicial independence without compromising the 
procedures of the Tax Court.”). 
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standard of Rule 183 would support189—the communications between the 
judges arguably should be disclosed to the parties.190  
2. Events Occurring Outside the Record 
The judges’ post-Ballard statements also revealed that events had 
occurred outside the official record of the case. In a footnote in its Ballard 
opinion, the Supreme Court quoted an order referring to a “reassignment” 
it called “enigmatic.”191 The order, which was dated December 15, 1999, 
“reassigned [the cases] from Special Trial Judge D. Irvin Couvillion to 
Judge Howard A. Dawson, Jr., for disposition.”192 December 15, 1999 was 
the same day the Tax Court issued its opinion in that case.193 The Supreme 
Court noted, “Judge Dawson rendered the final decision of the Tax Court 
on the same day the case was ‘reassigned’ to him. Had he faced a recast 
Rule 183(b) report, it is doubtful that he could have absorbed and acted 
upon it so swiftly.”194  
The judges’ statements helped clear up confusion about that order. In 
his statement, Judge Dawson explained that STJ Couvillion submitted his 
report to the Chief Judge on June 23, 1998, and “[a]fter preliminary 
review in the Chief Judge’s office, the report was referred to me on July 
14, 1998, by the Chief Judge for review and adoption if I agreed with 
it.”195 Judge Dawson further explained that, after working with STJ 
Couvillion on the report in the collaborative process described above:196 
 
 
 189. See Ballard, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *13–*16 (11th Cir. 2008) (adopting approach of 
Stone v. Comm’r); Stone v. Comm’r, 865 F.2d 342, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[W]e are persuaded that the 
language of the Tax Court Rule applicable to this case (and still applicable under a different number) 
sought to establish the relatively high level of deference that the phrase ‘clearly erroneous’ entails.”); 
id. at 347 (“[W]e take a brief detour to note, but not resolve, a conflict over the exact role of an 
appellate court where it confronts conflicting decisions by an initial fact-finder and an intermediate 
court, with the clearly erroneous standard governing both stages of review.”). Stone is discussed 
further below. See infra text accompanying notes 250–52. 
 190. Cf. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(B)(7) cmt. (“If communication between the 
trial judge and the appellate court with respect to a proceeding is permitted, a copy of any written 
communication or the substance of any oral communication should be provided to all parties.”). 
 191. Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 54 n.10 (2005).  
 192. Id. (quoting App. to Kanter Pet. for Cert. 113a–114a). The order further stated, “After the 
Special Trial Judge submitted a report . . . these cases were referred to Judge Dawson on September 2, 
1998, for review and, if approved, for adoption.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). According to 
Judge Dawson, the date of September 2, 1998, specified in the order was incorrect; it was actually 
September 2, 1999. See Clarifying Statements, supra note 163 (statement of Judge Dawson). 
 193. See infra text accompanying note 201. 
 194. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 54 n.10.  
 195. Clarifying Statements, supra note 163 (statement of Judge Dawson) (footnote omitted). 
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 176–82. 
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On September 2, 1999, I began a final review of Special Trial Judge 
Couvillion’s new report. On October 25, 1999, I adopted the new 
report and submitted it to Chief Judge Cohen. On November 4, 
1999, the Chief Judge approved the report with some modifications 
and directed that it be filed as a Memorandum Opinion. On 
December 15, 1999, Chief Judge Cohen by Order reassigned the 
cases to me for decision, and the new report, with some technical 
corrections recommended by the Reporter’s Office, was officially 
filed . . . on that date.197 
Thus, the official record of the case, including the docket entries, failed 
to reflect the initial assignment of the matter to Judge Dawson,198 who 
explained that it occurred on July 14, 1998.199 The docket entries for the 
case also do not reflect the “referral” to Judge Dawson referred to in the 
order, which related to the revised, collaborative report, and which Judge 
Dawson explained occurred on September 2, 1999.200 The docket entry 
system merely reflects, as its first assignment of the case to Judge 
Dawson, a “reassignment” from Judge Couvillion (who had been assigned 
the case in 1994) on the date the opinion was issued in 1999.201 Any other 
assignments to Judge Dawson apparently occurred informally.202 
Interestingly, in Freytag, which was also a Rule 183 case and also had 
a voluminous record,203 the Supreme Court noted that: 
Special Trial Judge Powell filed his proposed findings and opinion 
with the Tax Court on October 21, 1987; that on that day the Chief 
 
 
 197. Clarifying Statements, supra note 163 (statement of Judge Dawson) (footnote omitted). 
 198. For example, the Tax Court Docket Inquiry for docket number 16421-90 (Claude M. and 
Mary B. Ballard) reflects assignment of the case to STJ Couvillion on January 7, 1994, and the next 
assignment as the December 15, 1999 reassignment to Judge Dawson. Docket, Ballard v. Comm’r, 78 
T.C.M. (CCH) 951 (1999) (No. 16421-90) [hereinafter Ballard Tax Court Docket Inquiry]. In Ballard, 
the Supreme Court noted, “The post-trial proceedings in the case are not fully memorialized in either 
the Tax Court’s docket records or its published orders, but certain salient events can be traced.” 
Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 49 (2005). 
 199. See Clarifying Statements, supra note 163 (statement of Judge Dawson). 
 200. See id. at n.1 (statement of Judge Dawson); see also supra note 192 (quoting order’s 
statement that “these cases were referred to Judge Dawson on September 2, 1998, for review and, if 
approved, for adoption”).  
 201. See, e.g., Ballard Tax Court Docket Inquiry, supra note 198. 
 202. In Ballard, the Supreme Court noted, “Had Judge Dawson turned back the report after first 
receiving it, an order recommitting the case to Judge Couvillion ‘with instructions,’ Rule 183(c), 
should have memorialized that action.” Ballard, 544 U.S. at 54 n.10. It appears from the subsequent 
statement of Judge Dawson that he did “turn back the report after first receiving it,” without that action 
being reflected in the record. Id. 
 203. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 871 n.1 (1991). Freytag involved “approximately $1.5 
billion in losses allegedly realized in a tax shelter scheme.” Id. at 871. Freytag is discussed in more 
detail at text accompanying notes 82–94, supra. 
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Judge issued an order reassigning the litigation to himself for 
disposition; and that on that same day the Chief Judge adopted the 
opinion of Judge Powell. Indeed, the opinion, including its 
appendix, covers 44 pages in the Tax Court Reports.204  
Accordingly, in Freytag, as in Ballard, the case was reassigned to the 
reviewing judge on the same day the Tax Court’s opinion, adopting the 
STJ’s report, was issued. In Freytag, the Supreme Court noted, “At oral 
argument . . . counsel observed that Judge Powell ‘sometime in the 
preceding 4 months had filed a report with the Chief Judge of the tax 
court.’”205 However, a docket inquiry on the Tax Court’s website for the 
Freytag case reflects assignment to STJ Powell on November 5, 1986 and 
an order reassigning the case to Judge Sterrett on October 21, 1987, the 
day the Tax Court’s opinion was issued.206 It does not contain any 
intervening notation of the filing of a report or a previous assignment to 
Judge Sterrett.207  
The events in Freytag suggest that sometime in the four months after 
the final briefs were filed, STJ Powell submitted to then–Chief Judge 
Sterrett a report, the submission of which is not reflected in the official 
record. That report might have been assigned by the Chief Judge to 
another judge to review or might have been assigned by the Chief Judge to 
himself from the first submission of the report; the record is silent as to 
which judge originally received the report.  
The events surrounding the case reassignments in both Ballard and 
Freytag—cases decided approximately twelve years apart in the Tax 
Court208—reveal that some of the assignments of judges occurred outside 
the official record. Moreover, they are not the only cases in which this 
occurred. Another Rule 183 case, Erhard v. Commissioner,209 involved an 
argument that the reviewing judge may have improperly “rubber stamped” 
the STJ’s report, rather than reviewing it.210 The docket inquiry system for 
Erhard reflects assignment of the case to STJ Gussis on January 19, 1988 
 
 
 204. Id. at 872 n.2 (citations omitted). 
 205. Id. The Court resolved the argument that the STJ actually decided the case, contrary to the 
statutory requirement that a regular judge do so, by stating, “We are not inclined to assume ‘rubber 
stamp’ activity on the part of the Chief Judge.” Id.  
 206. See Docket Inquiry, Freytag v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 849 (1987) (No. 4934-82), aff’d, 501 U.S. 
868, available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/Docket.htm.  
 207. See id. The immediately preceding docket entry is from four months earlier, on June 22, 
1987, and refers to “STIPULATION re: reassignment to S.T. Judge Powell. (file per judge).” Id. 
 208. Freytag, 89 T.C. 849 (1987); Inv. Research Assoc. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951 (1999). 
 209. 46 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 930 (1995).  
 210. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 872 n.2; Erhard, 46 F.3d at 1476. 
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and an “ORDER that case is reassigned to Judge Scott” on July 1, 1991, 
the same day the Tax Court’s memorandum opinion in that case was 
issued.211 Once again, there is no record in the docket inquiry system of an 
intervening report or assignment.  
A check of a number of other pre-Ballard opinions in cases tried under 
Rule 183 reveals similar reassignment to the reviewing judge on the date 
the opinion was entered.212 Apparently the submission of STJ’s report to 
the Chief Judge and assignment of the case to a reviewing judge at that 
time was not routinely memorialized in the record of the case.213 Yet, any 
practice in this regard was not published in the Tax Court’s rules.  
3. 900 Cases, 117 Reports 
The events in the Ballard litigation raised the question of how many 
other Rule 183 cases, decided since the rule was changed in 1983 to 
eliminate transparency, as discussed below,214 involved changes between 
the original report of the STJ who presided over the trial and the Tax 
Court opinion that “adopted” it. The Oversight Subcommittee of the 
House Ways and Means Committee215 and the Chicago Tribune requested 
copies of the original reports in other cases tried under Rule 183.216 The 
Tribune reported that out of more than 900 cases in which a STJ had 
issued a report adopted by the Tax Court, only 117 original reports could 
be located.217  
 
 
 211. See Docket Inquiry, Erhard v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1 (1991) (No. 39473-85), aff’d 46 
F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 212. See, e.g., Docket Inquiry, Hyler v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 766 (2005) (No. 10839-04); 
Docket Inquiry, Hitchen v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 471 (2004) (No. 1827-95); Bernal v. Comm’r, 
120 T.C. 102 (2003) (No. 930-02); Docket Inquiry, Armstrong v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 94 (2000) (No. 
7267-98); Docket Inquiry, Yuen v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 123 (1999) (No. 16025-98). Rosenbaum v. 
Comm’r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 825 (1983), rev’d sub. nom. Stone v. Comm’r, 865 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 
1989), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 245–49, was not found in the Tax Court’s docket 
inquiry system, probably because of the age of the case. 
 213. This practice changed following Ballard. For example, the docket inquiry for Butner v. 
Commissioner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1290 (2007) (No. 21334-03), reflects “RECOMMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, S.T. Judge” on October 21, 2005; a January 
23, 2006 “ORDER that case is reassigned to Judge Chiechi”; and entry of decision on May 31, 2007. 
 214. See infra text accompanying notes 253–56. 
 215. See Tandon & Miller, supra note 135, at 395–96. 
 216. Possley, Tax Court Case Stirs Multiple Questions, supra note 6. 
 217. See Possley, Tax Court Findings Secretly Changed, supra note 6; see also Sheryl Stratton, 
Tax Court Chief Judge Speaks Out on Ballard Procedure, 108 TAX NOTES 1510, 1512 (2005) 
[hereinafter Stratton, Chief Judge Speaks Out]. Out of the 117 disclosed STJ reports, five, including 
the one in Ballard, reflected differences between the original findings and the Tax Court’s opinion. See 
Possley, Tax Court Findings Secretly Changed, supra note 6; Sheryl Stratton, In Ballard’s Wake, Tax 
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Tax Notes reported that the reason so many of the original factfinding 
documents in these cases could not be located was that the Tax Court 
treated them as the private papers of the STJs.218 “After the rule change in 
1983, no one at the Tax Court, including the STJs, considered the initial 
draft something that the public would see, according to Judge Gerber. 
Each judge was permitted to choose his or her own retention  
policies . . . .”219  
Thus, because the pre-Ballard version of Rule 183 omitted the 
provisions that had required STJ reports to be served on the parties and 
included in the record, as discussed below,220 but did not address record-
keeping procedures, the Tax Court established an unpublished internal 
guideline. The Tax Court’s chosen policy was one that did not provide for 
systematic preservation of the original reports, and no outside oversight 
was exercised over that decision. 
4. Other Transparency Issues 
The issues revealed in the Ballard litigation were not the first to reflect 
a lack of transparency by the Tax Court in areas in which courts generally 
have transparent procedures. Historically, for example, when the Tax 
Court reviewed opinions in court conference, the judges’ votes on those 
opinions were not disclosed.221 The Tax Court’s practice at one time was 
such that even the identity of the judges who had participated in 
conference review of a particular case was not always apparent, as a 1954 
Court of Appeals opinion points out:  
 
 
Court Releases Initial Reports, 108 TAX NOTES 1230, 1232 (2005) [hereinafter Stratton, Ballard’s 
Wake].  
 Then–Chief Judge Gerber reportedly explained: 
A thorough search was made, including inquiries of retired judicial officers, and all 
computers were searched for electronic copies . . . . Most of the 117 are relatively 
contemporaneous, in that many judges and STJs tended to discard their deliberative materials 
after the decisions in those cases become final . . . . Judge Dawson, who was one of the 
principal reviewing and adopting judges, maintained all of those documents since May 2001, 
when the issue of the status of the STJs’ reports became prominent . . . . 
Stratton, Chief Judge Speaks Out, supra, at 1512.  
 218. Stratton, Ballard’s Wake, supra note 217, at 1232. 
 219. Id.  
 220. See infra text accompanying notes 253–56. 
 221. Harold Dubroff & Dan S. Grossman, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 
Part VI: Trial and Post-Trial Procedure, 42 ALB. L. REV. 191, 242 (1978), reprinted in DUBROFF, 
supra note 21, at 358 (“Although the court has always indicated in its published reports whether a 
decision has been subject to conference review, full publication of the votes of the members has not 
been required.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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[I]n this case at least fifteen of the sixteen judges must have 
participated since seven of them dissented from the decision which 
the court entered. The record discloses the names of twelve of these 
judges but neither we nor the parties know from the record how 
many others participated or who they were.222  
The Court of Appeals further explained that judicial norms require 
disclosure of the names of the judges who participated in a particular 
decision. “Only thus can the parties know whether a quorum of qualified 
judges has decided their controversy.”223 
Nonetheless, despite periodic study of the issue and consideration of 
proposals for including in the record the names or numbers of judges 
participating or not participating in the decision, that information remained 
confidential for decades.224 In 1955, the recommendation of a special 
committee that those judges who did not participate in the court’s 
discussion and did not vote on the case be identified was not approved.225 
One of the reasons was that “objections to exposing the internal operations 
were raised, and notwithstanding the interest of the bar and others in the 
views of the judges on questions before the court, it was believed that 
practice by the court should not be affected by such interest or 
speculation.”226 The issue was reconsidered in 1969, when the Tax Court 
statutorily became an Article I court but, even then, the Tax Court did not 
change its practice.227  
Finally, in 1984, then–Chief Judge Dawson announced that this 
information would be published. “The reasons for the change were that the 
‘publication of such information is a traditional function of the judicial 
process’ and that the vote in conference is an official act of which the 
public is entitled to be informed.”228 Thus, the change was made fifteen 
years after the Tax Court officially became a court. 
 
 
 222. Stern v. Comm’r, 215 F.2d 701, 706–07 (3d Cir. 1954); see also Dubroff & Grossman, supra 
note 221, at 243, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 359 (discussing this issue and the Stern 
case). 
 223. Stern, 215 F.2d at 706. 
 224. Dubroff & Grossman, supra note 221, at 242–43, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 
358–60. 
 225. Id. at 243–44, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 359–60. 
 226. Id. at 244, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 360. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Harold Dubroff & Charles M. Greene, Recent Developments in the Business and Procedures 
of the United States Tax Court, Part Five: Court Conferences, 52 ALB. L. REV. 147, 148 n.10 (1987) 
(citing 2A LAURENCE F. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 8.37 (Supp. 1988)). 
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A more recent example is the Tax Court’s former practice of keeping 
from the public both the opinions and the files in “small tax cases”229 (S 
cases), even though the Tax Court’s opinions and evidence, with limited 
exceptions for trade secrets and the like, are required by statute to be 
available to the public.230 S cases are decided, generally by STJs, under a 
more informal procedure than the court’s regular cases.231 Cases eligible 
for the procedure are generally those with no more than a certain amount 
of money in controversy.232  
Tax Notes reported, in part, that practitioners “point out that the IRS is 
provided the summary opinions but the general public is not, and that that 
gives the IRS an undue litigation advantage. The IRS is able to assess the 
Tax Court’s reaction to certain issues and arguments based on information 
unavailable to the taxpayer.”233 Because decisions in S cases are not 
appealable, appellate courts can exercise no oversight over the S case 
process. To its credit, the Tax Court did eventually make the S case 
opinions and files available to the public, apparently in response to 
criticism of its nondisclosure practice.234  
B. Rule-Making Procedures 
The Tax Court is empowered by statute to promulgate its own rules of 
practice and procedure. Internal Revenue Code section 7453 provides, in 
relevant part: “Except in the case of proceedings conducted under section 
7436(c) or 7463, the proceedings of the Tax Court and its divisions shall 
be conducted in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure 
(other than rules of evidence) as the Tax Court may prescribe.”235 Section 
 
 
 229. See Leandra Lederman, Tax Court S Cases: Does the ‘S’ Stand for Secret?, 79 TAX NOTES 
257 (1998).  
 230. I.R.C. § 7461 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 231. See id. §§ 7443A(b), 7463; TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 170. 
 232. The dollar cap was increased from $10,000 to $50,000 in 1998. See Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3103, 112 Stat. 685, 731 (1998). 
Currently, about half of the Tax Court’s docket consists of S cases. See supra note 132. 
 233. David Lupi-Sher, Small Tax Court Cases—Has Their Time Come?, 83 TAX NOTES 614, 617 
(1999). 
 234. See id. (“S-case files (as distinguished from just the opinions) are open for public inspection 
and have been for about a year . . . .”). Currently, Tax Court regular and memorandum opinions from 
September 25, 1995, are available on the Tax Court’s website. Summary opinions are available 
beginning January 1, 2001. See United States Tax Court Opinions Search, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/ 
UstcInOp/asp/HistoricOptions.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). 
 235. I.R.C. § 7453. Much of the language regarding the Tax Court’s authority to make its own 
procedural rules can be traced back to the original 1924 statute that authorized the Board of Tax 
Appeals, predecessor of the Tax Court. See Dubroff, supra note 51, at 95, reprinted in DUBROFF, 
supra note 21, at 89 (“[T]he statute . . . stated that ‘proceedings of the Board and its divisions shall be 
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7463(a) provides that for small tax cases, “[n]otwithstanding the 
provisions of section 7453, such proceedings shall be conducted in 
accordance with such rules of evidence, practice, and procedure as the Tax 
Court may prescribe.”236 Thus, the Tax Court has the statutory authority to 
prescribe its own procedural rules for both regular and small tax cases. 
From the first days of the Board of Tax Appeals, the procedural rules 
generally conformed to those applicable in formal judicial proceedings.237  
1. The Pre-1984 Transparent Procedure for Resolving Large Cases 
Tried by Special Trial Judges 
As indicated above,238 tax deficiency cases involving large dollar 
amounts are cases that STJs are authorized to hear but not decide.239 Prior 
to 1983, Tax Court Rule 182 set forth procedures applicable to large cases 
assigned to STJs.240 That Rule, which was modeled after a Court of Claims 
rule,241 required the Special Trial Judge to “file his report, including 
findings of fact and opinion.”242 The report was then served on the parties, 
each of whom had an opportunity to file “a brief setting forth any 
exceptions of law or of fact to that report.”243  
 
 
conducted in accordance with such rules of evidence and procedure as the Board may prescribe.’” 
(quoting Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 253, 337 (1924))). One 
of the first acts of the Board of Tax Appeals was to write rules of practice and procedure so that 
taxpayers would know how to proceed with appeals. Id. at 94, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 
88–89. Although the statute also provided that the Board prescribe its own rules of evidence, the Board 
chose instead “to adopt judicial rules of evidence.” DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 95.  
 236. I.R.C. § 7463. Section 7436(c) provides, in part, with respect to employment tax cases 
involving less than $50,000 in dispute for each calendar quarter, that “[a]t the option of the petitioner, 
concurred in by the Tax Court or a division thereof before the hearing of the case, proceedings under 
this section may (notwithstanding the provisions of section 7453) be conducted subject to the rules of 
evidence, practice, and procedure applicable under section 7463.” § 7436(c)(1). 
 237. Dubroff, supra note 51, at 95, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 21, at 89–90. 
 238. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 239. STJs generally do not have authority to make the court’s decision in cases involving amounts 
in excess of $50,000. See I.R.C. § 7443A(b), (c); see also supra note 140. 
 240. See TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 182 (1979) (redesignated 1983), reprinted in 71 T.C. 1214 
(1979).  
 241. See 60 T.C. 1150 (1973) (“This rule is intended to make the use of commissioners more 
effective, and to provide procedures more comparable to those which obtain in the Court of Claims.”). 
This is probably not a coincidence. “In authorizing the use of commissioners in the Tax Court, 
Congress evidently had in mind the similar practice of the Court of Claims, since the same travel and 
subsistence allowances were provided for.” Edward N. Polisher, Tax Court Commissioners, 28 TAXES 
413, 413–14 (1950).  
 242. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 182 (1979) (redesignated 1983), reprinted in 71 T.C. 1214 (1979).  
 243. Id. The rule provided, in relevant part: 
 (b) Special Trial Judge’s Report: After all the briefs have been filed by all the parties or 
the time for doing so has expired, the Special Trial Judge shall file his report, including his 
findings of fact and opinion. A copy of the report shall forthwith be served on each party.  
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Under this version of the rule, which made apparent to the parties and 
the Court of Appeals any changes between the report served on the parties 
and the opinion of the Tax Court, there rarely were any such changes.244 
The notable exception is Rosenbaum v. Commissioner,245 a 1983 Tax 
Court case involving large deficiencies and additions to tax for fraud. In 
that case, both the taxpayer and the IRS filed exceptions to the report.246 
The reviewing judge, who did not see the witnesses,247 agreed with the 
IRS’s objection to the STJ’s finding that the taxpayers, Stone and 
Rosenbaum, had no fraud liability.248 The Tax Court opinion states, in 
part: “The record is replete with evidence of fraud. A merely cursory 
review of the record reveals no less than nine strong indicia of fraud, 
which apply to either Stone, or Rosenbaum, or both.”249  
Rosenbaum was reversed on appeal.250 The Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit explained: 
The Tax Court called no witnesses but reviewed the exhibits and 
6000 pages of testimony accumulated by the Trial Judge. Declining 
to credit the testimony of Stone and Rosenbaum, it rejected the Trial 
Judge’s report . . . . 
 In the face of these divergent fact findings, the scope of the Tax 
Court’s review of the Trial Judge is critical. . . . [W]e are persuaded 
that the language of the Tax Court Rule applicable to this case . . . 
sought to establish the relatively high level of deference that the 
 
 
 (c) Exceptions: Within 45 days after service of the Special Trial Judge’s report, a party 
may file with the Court a brief setting forth any exceptions of law or of fact to that report. 
Within 30 days of service upon him of such brief, any other party may file a brief in response 
thereto. 
Id. 
 244. “From 1976 to 1983, for example, there were only six cases, out of approximately 680 
decisions, in which the Tax Court did not adopt the opinion of the STJ, and only one case in which the 
Tax Court ‘reversed’ the STJ.” Brief for Respondent at 17–18, Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40 (2005) 
(No. 03-184), reprinted in Justice Files Supreme Court Brief in Kanter, Ballard Cases, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Nov. 30, 2004, available at 2004 TNT 230-14 (LEXIS). “In 14 (out of approximately 680) 
other cases, the Tax Court adopted the opinion of the STJ with modifications that were, in most 
instances, described as ‘minor.’” Id. at 18 n.4.  
 Rosenbaum v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 825 (1983), rev’d sub nom. Stone v. Comm’r, 
865 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which was decided by the Tax Court in 1983, is a case that could be 
described as involving a “reversal” of the STJ. See infra text accompanying notes 245–49. 
 245. 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 825.  
 246. See id. at 827. 
 247. See id. 
 248. Id. at 875. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Stone v. Comm’r, 865 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
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phrase “clearly erroneous” entails. By contrast, the Tax Court 
described its review of the Trial Judge’s report in terms that suggest 
it saw the standard of review as falling somewhere between de novo 
review and a mild presumption in favor of the correctness of the 
Trial Judge’s decision.251 
The Court of Appeals found “the Tax Court’s rejection of the Trial 
Judge’s findings to have been clearly erroneous in light of the deference 
that the Tax Court owed the Trial Judge. Accordingly [it] reverse[d] and 
remand[ed] for computation of tax in accordance with the findings of the 
Trial Judge.”252 Thus, on appeal, the findings and decision of the trier of 
fact were sustained, despite the different view of the reviewing judge, a 
regular judge of the Tax Court. This contrasts with the initial result in the 
Ballard litigation—in which the Courts of Appeals did not know the STJ’s 
initial findings (or even know that those findings were later revised)—and 
in which all three Courts of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s 1999 
decision.  
2. Why Was a Nontransparent Procedure Adopted? 
In 1983, the Tax Court adopted amendments to Rule 182 (which 
became Rule 183). The revised rule read, in part, as follows: 
 (b) Special Trial Judge’s Report: After all the briefs have been 
filed by all the parties or the time for doing so has expired, the 
Special Trial Judge shall submit his report, including the findings of 
fact and opinion, to the Chief Judge, and the Chief Judge will assign 
the case to a Division of the Court. 
 (c) Action on the Report: The Division to which the case is 
assigned may adopt the Special Trial Judge’s report or may modify 
it or may reject it in whole or in part, or may direct the filing of 
additional briefs or may receive further evidence or may direct oral 
argument, or may recommit the report with instructions. Due regard 
shall be given to the circumstance that the Special Trial Judge had 
the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, and the 
finding of fact recommended by the Special Trial Judge shall be 
presumed to be correct.253 
 
 
 251. Id. at 344. 
 252. Id. (emphasis added).  
 253. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 183 (1983), reprinted in 81 T.C. 1069 (1983).  
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The Tax Court did not fully explain the reason for the amendment. The 
explanatory note merely stated, in part, without elaboration, “The prior 
provisions for service of the Special Trial Judge’s report on each party and 
for the filing of exceptions to that report have been deleted.”254 The note 
does not mention an additional, subtle but important, change in the rule: 
the word “file” with respect to the STJ’s action on the report was changed 
to “submit.”255 The change apparently had the effect of taking the report 
out of the record on appeal by removing it from the ambit of Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 10.256  
The Tax Court also did not solicit comments from the public generally 
on that or other amendments to its rules made at that time,257 although 
“[c]omments were solicited from the private and public tax bar concerning 
the Tax Court’s proposed changes to Rule 183.”258 In addition, as the 
Supreme Court pointed out in Ballard,259 the actual changes in Tax Court 
practice that followed the amendments to Rule 183 were not apparent from 
the amendments themselves or the accompanying explanatory note.  
In a 1987 article, Professor Harold Dubroff and Charles Greene 
explained that the Tax Court first saw an opportunity to gain expediency 
by eliminating the opportunity of the parties to file objections to STJ 
reports in cases involving $2,500 or less that were not decided under the 
more informal S case procedure (although they were eligible for that 
procedure): 
 
 
 254. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 183 note (1983), reprinted in 81 T.C. 1070 (1983).  
 255. See Leandra Lederman, Transparency and Obfuscation in Tax Court Procedure, 102 TAX 
NOTES 1539, 1540 (2004). Compare TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 183(b) (1983) (stating that “the Special 
Trial Judge shall submit a report . . . to the Chief Judge”) with TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 182(b) (1979) 
(stating that “the Special Trial Judge shall file his report”). 
 256. See Lederman, supra note 255, at 1540. In his dissent in Ballard, then–Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, who argued that “[t]he Tax Court’s compliance with its own Rules is a matter on which we 
should defer to the interpretation of that court,” Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 68 (2005) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), also noted this change. Id. at 69 & n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 When Rule 183 was amended in 2005 in response to Ballard, the word “submit” was changed 
back to “file”; Rule 183(b) now reads, “After all the briefs have been filed by all the parties or the time 
for doing so has expired, the Special Trial Judge shall file recommended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and a copy of the recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law shall be 
served in accordance with Rule 21.” TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 183(b). 
 257. See infra text accompanying notes 277–79 (describing change to that effect that took place in 
2005). 
 258. Stratton, Chief Judge Speaks Out, supra note 217, at 1511 (comments attributed to then–
Chief Judge Gerber).  
 259. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 57 (“Nowhere in the Tax Court’s Rules is this joint enterprise 
described.”); id. at 57 n.12 (“Nor does any other Tax Court publication, such as an interpretive guide 
or policy statement, suggest that the 1983 amendments to Rule 183 altered the internal process by 
which the Tax Court judge reviews the special trial judge’s findings.”). 
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[T]he court [thereby] eliminated the unnecessary restraints on 
judicial time and attention that could arise if one or both parties 
objected to the report of a special trial judge in a case involving a 
small amount of tax. Moreover, by eliminating the time-consuming 
procedures in cases not exceeding the $2,500 limitation, the 
authority of special trial judges was made consistent in cases 
involving small amounts of tax, regardless of whether the case was 
conducted under the small tax case procedure. In cases involving 
amounts exceeding the $2,500 limitation, however, the procedures 
for service on the parties and for filing party exceptions continued 
to apply.260  
The next paragraph of the article explains that, subsequently, “[i]n 
1983, the procedures for service of the reports of special trial judges were 
completely eliminated. Moreover, the ability of parties to file briefs 
objecting to the report of a special trial judge was also eliminated unless 
the court otherwise directs.”261 The Dubroff and Greene article does not 
explain why, in 1983, the procedure for service on the parties and the 
filing of objections was abolished for all cases to which it would otherwise 
have applied (not just those involving $2,500 or less). Perhaps this was 
because the note to amended Rule 183 provides no explanation of why the 
rule was changed.262  
Certainly, elimination of the process of serving the report on the party 
and allowing the opportunity for exceptions may have helped expedite 
cases. However, the prioritization of expediency over transparency and 
party participation does not carry the same force in large cases as it might 
in small ones. In particular, the consistency justification that was applied 
to cases involving amounts up to $2,500 does not, by its terms, apply to 
cases involving larger amounts.263  
Most important, the elimination of additional briefs or Tax Court 
process did not need to also entail eliminating the report from the record 
on appeal.264 In fact, removing the provision for serving the report on the 
 
 
 260. Harold Dubroff & Charles M. Greene, Recent Developments in the Business and Procedures 
of the United States Tax Court, Part One: The Tax Court Docket, 52 ALB. L. REV. 33, 64 (1987). 
 261. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 254–55. 
 263. The consistency rationale might even be questioned in small-dollar cases not tried under the 
small tax case procedure. The small tax case procedure is designed to be expeditious and relatively 
informal, and its use is elective. See Geier, supra note 66, at 986; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
COURTS WITH TAX JURISDICTION, supra note 75, at 304.  
 264. The same is true for the explanation Judge Gerber gave during his recent term as Chief 
Judge, which relates to expediency in trying large numbers of cases:  
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parties and allowing them to file exceptions, in and of itself, probably 
would not have kept the report out of the record on appeal. Rather, it was 
the subtle change of the word “file” to “submit” that accomplished this 
change.265 This critical change was not mentioned in the note to the 
amendments to the rule, although it probably is not obvious on an initial 
reading of the rule.266 
Randall Dick has suggested that the Tax Court changed its rule because 
of its experience with the reviewing judge’s reversal of the STJ’s 
factfinding in the Rosenbaum case.267 The Tax Court’s opinion in 
Rosenbaum was issued in late February of 1983,268 and the Tax Court 
adopted its amended rule in early September of 1983.269 By bringing the 
Rule 183 process behind closed doors, the Tax Court eliminated public 
knowledge of subsequent disagreements between the STJ and the 
reviewing judge of the type that occurred in Rosenbaum. The Tax Court 
also limited its exposure to the possibility of reversal on that basis. Judge 
Cudahy, dissenting in Estate of Kanter, commented, “[O]f course, an 
appellate-style procedure such as that typical in all other areas of federal 
administrative adjudication would facilitate challenges, whether made by 
the taxpayer or by the Commissioner. The previous procedure may well 
have been abrogated for exactly this reason.”270  
 
 
Following an explosion in the court’s docket (from 17,000 cases in the mid-1970s to more 
than 80,000 cases in 1983), a large portion of the approximately 40,000 new cases filed 
annually were being handled by the newly expanded ranks of STJs . . . . In an attempt to 
streamline the handling of those cases, Rule 183 was modified to reduce the number of briefs 
required by the parties, and to, “in effect, treat the STJs, for purposes of review and issuance 
of their opinions, in the same manner as presidentially appointed judges” . . . . 
Stratton, Chief Judge Speaks Out, supra note 217, at 1511 (quoting Judge Gerber).  
 Tax Court statistics show 58,333 cases pending in fiscal year 1983. Dubroff & Greene, supra note 
260, at 35 tbl.1 (reproducing U.S. TAX CT. FISCAL 1987 ANN. REP.); see also TAX COURT 1990 
REPORT, supra note 126, at 1. The number of cases filed and pending increased each year by about 
5,000 to 10,000 cases from 1983 to 1986; there were 83,686 cases pending in 1986. See Dubroff & 
Greene, supra note 260, at 35 tbl.1 (reproducing U.S. TAX CT. FISCAL 1987 ANN. REP.). In 1987, the 
number of cases filed and number of dockets pending began to decrease. See id. at 34–35; TAX COURT 
1990 REPORT, supra note 126, at 1. 
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 255–56. 
 266. See id. 
 267. Randall G. Dick, Further Thoughts on Tax Court Special Trial Judge Reports, 90 TAX 
NOTES 1253, 1253 (2001).  
 268. See id. 
 269. See TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 2(a) (1983), reprinted in 81 T.C. 1045 (1983). 
 270. Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 337 F.3d 833, 879 (7th Cir. 2003) (Cudahy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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3. Post-Ballard Rule Making 
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ballard, the Tax Court 
amended Rule 183, returning to its pre-1983 procedure under which the 
report of the STJ in a case decided under Rule 183 is included in the 
record and served on the parties, who are given an opportunity to file 
objections to it.271 However, it remains to be seen how much the now-
transparent Rule 183 procedure, which is a discretionary alternative to 
assignment of large-dollar cases to regular judges,272 will be used. Use of 
Rule 183 declined during the Ballard controversy,273 and one tax 
controversy scholar was quoted as commenting that “[o]ne likely effect is 
that the Tax Court will avoid risking a repeat of this situation by reducing, 
if not eliminating, assignments of regular cases to special trial judges.”274 
Tax Notes also reported that Tax Court Judge Goeke stated that, with the 
Tax Court’s current inventory comparatively low, “it is unlikely a special 
trial judge would be assigned to cases similar in magnitude to Kanter and 
Ballard.”275  
In Ballard, the Supreme Court not only held that the Tax Court’s 
collaborative factfinding process did not comply with its own rule, it also 
critiqued the Tax Court’s rule-making procedures, which, at the time, 
occurred without a public notice-and-comment process.276 The Court 
commented, “Although the Tax Court solicits comments on proposed rule 
changes from the American Bar Association’s Section on Taxation, the 
 
 
 271. See TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 183. Rule 183 now provides, in part:  
Within 45 days after the service of the recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
a party may serve and file specific, written objections to the recommended findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. A party may respond to another party’s objections within 30 days 
after being served with a copy thereof. The above time periods may be extended by the 
Special Trial Judge. 
Id.  
 272. See I.R.C. § 7443A(b)(7) (LexisNexis 2007). 
 273. “The number of Rule 183 cases has steadily decreased, with only about six pending, 
including the Ballard group, at the time of the Supreme Court’s opinion earlier this year, [Chief Judge 
Gerber] said.” Stratton, Chief Judge Speaks Out, supra note 217, at 1512.  
 274. See Sheryl Stratton, Original Tax Court Report Found No Fraud by Kanter, Ballard, 107 
TAX NOTES 1216, 1219 (2005) (reporting statement of tax professor Steve Johnson).  
 275. Audrey Nutt, Judges Discuss Electronic Filing Program, Impact of Ballard Changes, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, May 8, 2006, available at 2006 TNT 88-8 (LEXIS).  
 276. Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 46 n.1 (2005). The purpose of providing public notice of a 
new or changed rule and an opportunity for comment “is to encourage public participation in the 
rulemaking process.” Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack 
Of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1727, 1728 (2007). 
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court apparently does not publish its proposals to, or accept comments 
from, the general public.”277 
After Ballard, the Tax Court issued a press release citing the Supreme 
Court’s comments on its rule-making process. In the press release, the Tax 
Court proposed revising Rule 1, in part, as follows: 
When new rules or amendments to these rules are proposed by the 
Court, notice of such proposals and the ability of the public to 
comment shall be provided to the bar and to the general public and 
shall be posted on the Court’s Internet Web site. If the Court 
determines that there is an immediate need for a particular rule or 
amendment to an existing rule, it may proceed without public notice 
and opportunity for comment, but the Court shall promptly 
thereafter afford such notice and opportunity for comment.278 
The Tax Court adopted the amended Rule in September 2005.279 
III. MAKING THE TAX COURT MORE JUDICIAL: A TWO-PART PROPOSAL  
As discussed above, the Tax Court currently is treated neither as an 
agency nor as a true court.280 It thus lacks the accountability those 
institutions experience. Yet, there is no compelling reason the Tax Court 
should be less accountable than other governmental institutions. Treating 
the Tax Court as either a court or an agency would provide it with more 
accountability than it has now. However, given the purely judicial nature 
of the Tax Court, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Freytag281 and 
evidenced by its statutory designation as a “court of record,”282 it is hard to 
 
 
 277. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 46 n.1 (citation omitted). 
 278. Press Release, Tax Court, Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Practice and Procedure 
Announced 1–2 (TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 1(b)) (July 7, 2005), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/ 
press/070705.pdf [hereinafter Tax Court Press Release of July 7, 2005]. 
 279. See Press Release, Tax Court, Amendments to the Rules of Practice and Procedure Adopted 
(Sept. 21, 2005) (adopting language cited above, as Rule 1(c)), available at http://www.ustaxcourt. 
gov/press/092105.pdf. 
 The Rule does not require the Tax Court to respond to comments, as agencies must. Cf. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(c) (LexisNexis 2007) (“After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter 
presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis 
and purpose.”); § 553(e) (“Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the 
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”). 
 280. See supra text accompanying notes 18–20. 
 281. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991) (“The Tax Court exercises judicial power to 
the exclusion of any other function. It is neither advocate nor rulemaker.”). 
 282. I.R.C. § 7441 (LexisNexis 2007). 
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consider the Tax Court anything but a court. It should be treated as such, 
for the sake of its litigants and the institution itself.  
Although the Tax Court has eventually responded when a specific 
nontransparent procedure has been criticized, a system that requires 
nontransparent processes to be uncovered has an inherent and fundamental 
flaw. That is, although some opacity, such as the pre-1998 failure to 
release S case opinions, is obvious and can thus draw criticism that may 
result in change, some practices that the affected parties might object to if 
they knew of them may never be discovered. Even the Ballard litigation, 
which led to multiple revelations about Tax Court practices, only resulted 
in those disclosures because attorney Randall Dick was suspicious of the 
Tax Court’s opinion, and he contacted judges who were willing to speak to 
him outside of the official proceedings. Such ad hoc oversight is 
insufficient to assure procedural fairness. 
With small statutory changes, Congress can continue the process of 
including the Tax Court in the judicial fold. The changes involve (1) 
adding the Tax Court to the list of courts served by the AOUSC, and (2) 
making the Tax Court subject to the Rules Enabling Act, so its rule 
making is overseen by the Judicial Conference. These amendments would 
bring increased accountability to the Tax Court and decrease its insularity. 
These proposals are discussed, in turn, below.  
A. Making the Tax Court Subject to the Administrative Office of U.S. 
Courts 
The AOUSC works “under the supervision and direction of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States.”283 “The Administrative Office [(AO)] 
conducts financial audits, program audits, reviews, assessments, and 
evaluations to promote effectiveness, efficiency, and economy in both AO 
and court operations.”284  
The AO is . . . the principal support entity for the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, the chief administrative 
policymaker for the federal courts. . . . Through its twenty-two 
committees, the Conference performs a wide range of statutory 
responsibilities. It routinely surveys conditions of business in the 
 
 
 283. 28 U.S.C. § 604(a) (LexisNexis 2007). 
 284. 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 40 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/dirrpt05/2005Annualreportslim.pdf 
[hereinafter 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AOUSC]. 
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courts, suggests uniform management procedures, supervises the 
director of the Administrative Office, and drafts legislation.285 
Bringing the Tax Court within the ambit of the AOUSC merely 
requires adding the Tax Court to the list of courts in 28 U.S.C. § 610, for 
which the AOUSC performs its enumerated duties. That simple change 
would increase the accountability of the Tax Court.286 It would also reduce 
the need for the Tax Court to duplicate initiatives or solve problems that 
have already been resolved for the federal courts by the AOUSC, thereby 
increasing the efficiency of the federal government. For example, such a 
change would remove the Tax Court’s burden of finding federal court 
space in which to sit when it rides circuit; the AOUSC is well positioned 
to arrange such space in the courts it already serves.287  
The change would also mean that the Tax Court would no longer make 
its budget requests directly to Congress288 but instead would make them 
centrally, along with the federal courts currently subject to the AOUSC. 
That would eliminate the Tax Court’s need to ask for funding from the 
entity that enacts the Internal Revenue Code. That procedural change 
would, in turn, increase the Tax Court’s appearance of impartiality, and, 
along with the Tax Court’s increased accountability, should increase 
public confidence in the independence of the Tax Court.  
In addition to increasing the Tax court’s accountability, making the 
Tax Court subject to the AOUSC would signal its parity with other federal 
courts. These effects should help foster norms of greater transparency in 
 
 
 285. John W. Winkle III, Interbranch Politics: The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts as 
Liaison, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 43, 45 (2003) (footnotes omitted). 
 286. By statute, the AOUSC is required, among other duties, to: 
 (2) Examine the state of the dockets of the courts; secure information as to the courts’ 
need of assistance; prepare and transmit semiannually to the chief judges of the circuits, 
statistical data and reports as to the business of the courts; 
 (3) Submit to the annual meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States, at least 
two weeks prior thereto, a report of the activities of the Administrative Office and the state of 
the business of the courts, together with the statistical data submitted to the chief judges of the 
circuits under paragraph (a)(2) of this section, and the Director’s recommendations, which 
report, data and recommendations shall be public documents. 
 (4) Submit to Congress and the Attorney General copies of the report, data and 
recommendations required by paragraph (a)(3) of this section . . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2)-(4). Section 604(a) provides the list of duties for the Director of the 
Administrative Office. However, section 602 provides, in part, that “[t]he Director may delegate any 
of the Director’s functions, powers, duties, and authority (except the authority to promulgate rules and 
regulations) to such officers and employees of the judicial branch of Government as the Director may 
designate . . . .” § 602(d). 
 287. See supra text accompanying notes 101–06. 
 288. See supra text accompanying notes 108–10. 
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the Tax Court, increase the respect accorded to the Tax Court, and lessen 
even further any lingering impression that the Tax Court is biased in favor 
of the government.289 Moreover, the change would be real, not merely 
symbolic.290  
Of course, there would be some cost in having the AOUSC provide 
services and oversight to an additional court. However, the number of Tax 
Court judges (nineteen judges provided for by statute, plus senior judges 
and STJs—currently thirty judges in all291) is small in comparison to the 
number of judges on the courts the AOUSC already serves.292 After an 
initial transition period, any additional costs for the AOUSC should be 
more than outweighed by the benefits of avoiding the duplication or 
omission of important procedures.  
An alternative to bringing the Tax Court under the aegis of the AOUSC 
would be to create a new body, such as an oversight board, to supervise 
the Tax Court, much as Congress did with respect to the IRS in 1998.293 
However, that approach would be costly and inefficient compared to using 
a structure that is already in place and already provides services and 
oversight to federal courts.  
B. Making the Tax Court Subject to the Rules Enabling Act 
Federal courts have the power to promulgate local rules.294 Under the 
Rules Enabling Act, “[a]ny rule prescribed by a court, other than the 
Supreme Court, under subsection (a) [of section 2071] shall be prescribed 
only after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for 
comment.”295 In addition, district court and circuit court rules are subject 
to oversight. Section 2071(c) provides: 
 
 
 289. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 290. Cf. Leandra Lederman, Taxpayer Rights in the Lurch: A Response to Professor Johnson, 88 
TAX NOTES 1041, 1041 (2000) (criticizing “taxpayer bill of rights” legislation that is more symbol 
than substance). 
 291. See United States Tax Court, Judges, supra note 35.  
 292. Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective 
Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 191–92 (1994) (“Counting only life 
tenured, authorized, non-vacant judgeships and including those judges who have taken ‘senior status,’ 
the federal life tenured judicial strength . . . [as of 1994] numbers over 1,100. . . .  When one also 
includes the fourth tier (the magistrate and bankruptcy judges) within the federal courts, the federal 
judicial strength grows to more than 1,850.”). Cf. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, 
AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tablek.pdf (listing for 2002, 
848 authorized Article III judgeships plus 10 temporary Article III judgeships, an increase from 1994). 
 293. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
§ 1001(a)(3), 112 Stat. 685, 689 (1998); I.R.C. § 7802 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 294. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (LexisNexis 2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1); FED. R. APP. P. 47. 
 295. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b). Interestingly, an argument can be made that, for this purpose, the term 
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 (1) A rule of a district court prescribed under subsection (a) shall 
remain in effect unless modified or abrogated by the judicial council 
of the relevant circuit. 
 (2) Any other rule prescribed by a court other than the Supreme 
Court under subsection (a) shall remain in effect unless modified or 
abrogated by the Judicial Conference.296 
The Judicial Conference, among other things, is required to “review rules 
prescribed under section 2071 of [title 28] by the courts, other than the 
Supreme Court and the district courts, for consistency with Federal 
law.”297  
 
 
“court” includes the Tax Court. Section 2071(a) reads, “The Supreme Court and all courts established 
by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules 
shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section 
2072 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (emphasis added). Section 2071(b) does not define the term 
“courts” or “courts established by Act of Congress,” nor are those terms defined for the purpose of that 
chapter. If interpreted literally, the phrase “court[] established by Act of Congress” would include the 
Tax Court. 
 Title 28 does reflect the possibility of different courts being covered by different provisions. For 
example, 28 U.S.C. § 610, the definitional section for the chapter relating to the AOUSC, states:  
As used in this chapter the word “courts” includes the courts of appeals and district courts of 
the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the 
District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United States Claims 
Court, and the Court of International Trade. 
Id. § 610 (emphasis added). That definition does not apply to section 2071 because section 2071 is in a 
different chapter than section 610 is.  
 The Tax Court has stated that the Rules Enabling Act does not apply to it. See Tax Court Press 
Release of July 7, 2005, supra note 278, at 3 (citing Judicial Improvement and Access to Justice Act, 
Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 405, 102 Stat. 4642, 4652 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)). 
The Judicial Improvement and Access to Justice Act amended the Rules Enabling Act by adding new 
versions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074 and 2077(b), and repealing § 2076, see Pub. L. No. 100-702, 
§§ 401, 403, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648–51 (1988). The Act also stated that “[t]he amendments made by this 
title shall not affect the authority of the Tax Court to prescribe rules under section 7453 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986.” Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 405, 102 Stat. 4642, 4652 (1988). Section 405 of the 
Judicial Improvement and Access to Justice Act does not address any other aspect of rule making, such 
as providing notice of proposed amendments to the rules and an opportunity for public comment, or 
the ability of the Judicial Conference to modify or abrogate a rule.  
 296. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c) (emphasis added).  
 297. 28 U.S.C. § 331. The “circuit judicial councils . . . govern the affairs of the individual judicial 
circuits.” Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s 
Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1175 (1996). 
[The] numerous, expert committees [of the Judicial Conference of the United States] develop 
policies ranging across a broad spectrum. . . . [One] area is the rules of practice and procedure 
that govern federal court litigation. Numerous Conference committees study the admiralty, 
appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal and evidentiary rules and formulate suggestions for 
improvements which the Supreme Court usually adopts. 
Carl Tobias, The Chief Justice and the Judicial Conference, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2005/09/ 
chief-justice-and-judicial-conference.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). 
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Tax Court rule making could be structured to add oversight beyond the 
minimal publicity now afforded by notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
while continuing to benefit from the court’s specialized expertise. This 
could be accomplished by adding the Tax Court to the list of courts subject 
to the AOUSC, as proposed above, and amending 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) to 
read: “The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress, 
including the United States Tax Court, may from time to time prescribe 
rules for the conduct of their business.”298 
Were this proposal enacted, the Tax Court’s rule making would be 
subject to the same provisions of the Rules Enabling Act that already 
govern the Court of Federal Claims.299 Like the Tax Court, the Court of 
Federal Claims is not a member of the Judicial Conference.300 In addition, 
the statutes authorizing each of the two courts to make their own 
procedural rules are very similar.301  
The proposed amendment would make the Tax Court’s proposed rules 
expressly subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b), which would statutorily require 
the Tax Court’s rules to be made public, with an opportunity for public 
comment.302 This would ensure that the Tax Court could not amend Rule 1 
to remove the notice procedures. In addition, it would make the Tax Court 
subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(2), which allows the Judicial Conference to 
modify or abrogate the rules promulgated by courts other than the 
 
 
 298. The proposed additions to 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) are in italics. In order to eliminate possible 
ambiguity, Code sections 7453 and 7463(a) could be amended to include the phrase “subject to the 
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a).” 
 299. See 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 2223 (2007). 28 U.S.C. § 2071 refers to “all courts 
established by Act of Congress.” 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); see also id. § 2071(b)–(e). That includes the 
Court of Federal Claims. See id. § 610. Public Law 102-572 provides that “[r]eference in any other 
Federal law or any document to . . . the ‘United States Claims Court’ shall be deemed to refer to the 
‘United States Court of Federal Claims.’” Pub. L. No. 102-572 § 902(b), 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (1992). 
 300. Only Article III judges may attend the Judicial Conference. See 28 U.S.C. § 331. Although 
the Court of Federal Claims is not a member of the Judicial Conference, under the Rules Enabling Act, 
the Judicial Conference is empowered to oversee its rule-making processes. See 32B AM. JUR. 2D 
Federal Courts § 2223 (2007). 
 301. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2503(b), with I.R.C. § 7453 (LexisNexis 2007). Admittedly, there is 
some awkwardness in having the Judicial Conference oversee courts—such as the Court of Federal 
Claims—that are not represented there. However, the alternatives of either no oversight at all or 
creation of a separate, and thus costly, oversight structure pose greater problems. Ideally, all courts 
overseen by the Judicial Conference should belong to it; Article I status should not preclude 
membership. Article I judges, such as bankruptcy judges, already serve on Judicial Conference 
committees. See Lloyd D. George, From Orphan to Maturity: The Development of the Bankruptcy 
System During L. Ralph Mecham’s Tenure as Director of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1491, 1492 (1995) (“Bankruptcy judges now participate on most 
Judicial Conference committees and have a voice in issues that affect them.”).  
 302. For clarity, 28 U.S.C. § 2071(f) could be amended to read as follows (added language in 
italics): “No rule may be prescribed by a district court or the United States Tax Court other than under 
this section.” 
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Supreme Court.303 The Judicial Conference would accordingly be required 
to review the Tax Court’s rules “for consistency with Federal law.”304 That 
oversight would help foster confidence in the Tax Court’s rule-making 
procedures. Following Ballard, that public confidence is particularly 
important. 
C. Implications of the Proposal 
Each of the proposal’s two major components would be 
straightforward, cost-effective, and beneficial. Although these proposed 
statutory amendments, were they enacted, likely would not occasion major 
changes in the day-to-day functioning of the Tax Court, they should help 
foster evolution in the court. Making the Tax Court subject to the same 
institutions that govern other courts would signal that the Tax Court is not 
an outlier that may depart from judicial norms. This would indicate that 
Congress expects the Tax Court to act like other courts and that its 
behavior is being monitored by institutions very familiar with such norms. 
One important aspect of this proposal is that it does not require 
transforming the Tax Court into an Article III court. Although not 
inconsistent with this proposal, that is a separate and likely controversial 
issue,305 and unnecessary to achieve the purposes of this proposal. The 
AOUSC already has authority with respect to certain Article I courts, 
including the Court of Federal Claims306 and the bankruptcy courts,307 
which are adjuncts to the district courts.308 Moreover, the AOUSC already 
has experience with respect to specialty courts. In addition to the Court of 
Federal Claims and the bankruptcy courts, the Court of International Trade 
is subject to the AOUSC.309  
Similarly, there is no reason that the Rules Enabling Act cannot apply 
to specialty courts or Article I courts that make their own procedural rules. 
 
 
 303. Professor Sisk has described the Judicial Conference’s power to modify or abrogate a Circuit 
Court’s rule as “little known, and seldom invoked.” Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate 
Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 51 (1997). 
However, providing the Judicial Conference with the power to modify or abrogate Tax Court rules 
would provide new oversight and accountability for the Tax Court. 
 304. See 28 U.S.C. § 331. 
 305. See supra text accompanying notes 59–64. 
 306. See 28 U.S.C. § 610; supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 307. See 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(13) (duties of director include laying “before Congress, annually, 
statistical tables that will accurately reflect the business transacted by the several bankruptcy courts, 
and all other pertinent data relating to such courts”). 
 308. The Judicial Conference also studies the bankruptcy rules to recommend improvements. 
Tobias, supra note 297. 
 309. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 610. It is also a member of the Judicial Conference. See id. § 331. 
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As discussed above, the Rules Enabling Act already applies to the Court of 
Federal Claims, a specialty Article I court that has a rule-making statute 
closely resembling the Tax Court’s rule-making statute.310 The proposal 
also would not require the statutes governing the Tax Court to be moved 
from Title 26 to Title 28, although that, too, would not be antithetical to it. 
Another important aspect of this proposal is that the combined changes 
should have a greater effect on the Tax Court’s evolution than if either 
change were made in isolation. Making both changes would result in 
accountability in a range of contexts that would include, but not be limited 
to, the Tax Court’s rule making. As the Tax Court becomes accustomed to 
greater transparency and oversight of its activities, it should become less 
insular.  
These incremental changes would not preclude further change or 
broader reform. Congress could take additional steps to bring the Tax 
Court more completely within the ambit of the Judicial Code. For 
example, it could add the Tax Court to 28 U.S.C. § 460, which currently 
makes “General Provisions Applicable to Courts and Judges”311 applicable 
to the Court of Federal Claims and the territorial courts.312 Similarly, 
Congress could add the Tax Court to 28 U.S.C. § 363, which requires the 
Court of Federal Claims and certain other specialized courts to develop 
procedures for the filing, investigation, and resolution of complaints 
relating to judges’ conduct.313 In addition, if new oversight mechanisms, 
such as an inspector general,314 are added for the federal courts, the Tax 
Court should be included in the list of courts within the purview of that 
mechanism. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Court is anomalous. Although it is solely a judicial tribunal 
and not an administrative agency, it is not an Article III federal court. 
Worse yet, it seems to have fallen into a gap between the branches of 
government so that it experiences the disciplining effect of neither the 
provisions—such as the APA and FOIA—that are applicable to agencies, 
 
 
 310. See supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
 311. See 28 U.S.C. ch. 21. 
 312. See id. § 460 (rendering applicable 28 U.S.C. §§ 452–459, 462). 
 313. Id. § 363. 
 314. See Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 785, 110th Cong. 
(proposing an “Inspector General” for the Judicial Branch); cf. Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and 
Oversight in the Federal Courts: Creating an Office of Inspector General, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 243 
(1999). 
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nor the bodies or provisions—such as the AOUSC, the Judicial 
Conference, and the Rules Enabling Act—applicable to federal courts.  
Ballard v. Commissioner315 was an important case, and not just for 
what it showed about the collaborative process the Tax Court used to 
arrive at a result that differed from the findings of the STJ who presided 
over the trial. Ballard also provided a window into otherwise opaque 
processes of a largely self-governing body. Examination of both the events 
surrounding the Ballard case and other actions for which the Tax Court 
has been criticized reveals the problems that can arise when a court is 
isolated from the rest of the judiciary and does not experience routine 
oversight other than through the appellate review process. That isolation 
can limit the internalization of judicial norms. In addition, events that go 
on outside that process—or are kept out of the record—are largely 
invisible even to affected parties. 
Because the Tax Court truly is a court, with solely judicial functions, it 
is most appropriate to treat it as one. As such, it should be subject to the 
AOUSC. That office can then “conduct program audits, reviews, 
assessments, and evaluations.”316 with respect to the Tax Court, and help 
oversee and facilitate such activities as data collection and the Tax Court’s 
rule-making processes. The Court of Federal Claims, an Article I court 
that also has jurisdiction over certain federal tax cases and promulgates its 
own procedural rules, already is subject to the AOUSC. Adding the Tax 
Court to the list of courts served by that body therefore would not be a 
radical change in law, much less require making the Tax Court an Article 
III court. The Tax Court’s rule-making process should also be brought in 
line with that of the Court of Federal Claims, which is required by statute 
to have an open process, and the rules of which are subject to modification 
by the Judicial Conference.  
These changes would have both substantive significance and symbolic 
value. Substantively, the Tax Court would gain support and guidance in 
areas in which it previously fended for itself, as well as increased 
accountability. Symbolically, Congress would be signaling that the Tax 
Court is not an outsider to the judicial system. This should help bring the 
Tax Court the recognition as a court that it deserves, thereby increasing its 
effectiveness. 
 
 
 315. 544 U.S. 40 (2005).  
 316. 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AOUSC, supra note 284, at 278.  
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